

The Power of 'IF'

Panayotis Zamaros

Lausanne, January 2006

For reference:

ZAMAROS, PANAYOTIS (2006), *The Power of 'IF'*, Vignette, Lausanne: P. Zamaros.

If, for one moment, it is true that the Christ came – not a ‘were’ but an ‘is’ as the presencing of a possibility, as the awareness of the temporariness of a promise that may not be held – by which I do not mean to imply the contrary, for to say ‘it is false that the Christ came’ becomes of another concern as the emphasis is on falsity rather than the truth of the event of the coming of the Christ, and hence the method and endeavor can be dissimilar, and I do not want to say that ‘it is not true that the Christ came’ for this is equally of yet another concern as it becomes necessary to find evidence to counter the possible truth of the assertion that the Christ came, regardless of the truth, that some may claim a fact, of the event, by introducing an externality, an exterior other that disallows the authority of the claim and undermines meaning, and this is a relational other that allows such authority ... *thus, to resume, if is the case that Christ came* ... and if I say ‘the case’ I do not mean to have or want to have tangible proof, or so-called archeological evidence that the Christ came, because having such evidence, if at all, only casts some light on the scriptures, which are far from being proof qua proof, whether convincing or otherwise, of the coming of the Christ – since, without being in the necessity to sustain the claim that scriptural evidence cannot constitute proof for there is no guarantee that the language used to describe the event of the coming of the Christ can indeed describe the event qua event since through a constructive and synthetic process the mind adds or removes to the event being described rather than describing it as such, to be considered convincing evidence so as to confirm the coming of the Christ, it removes the very purpose of seeking evidence of such coming as it undermines the power of ‘if’, of the possibility, of the anxiety of a possible falsity in the effort or obsession of wanting to establish a truth that may not be – even the truth of such an assertion may yet to be proven, and certainly, for I am certain even if you may not perceive it, I do not mean to imply that I have or need to have faith in the coming of the Christ because such a belief, such a certainty without default, is precluded by the use of ‘if’, which some may want to eliminate, even eradicate all possibility and choice, in a certain conviction that convicts the one who has made the promise of a disclosure, that of the possibility as opportunity, ... *thus in the realization of the possibility that it is the case that the Christ came, the consequence might be of paramount importance, for think, for an instance, what it means to be, in essence and fate, you and I, the kin of the being of creation: you and me are the Christ* ... for if I am created at the image of my creator, I do not see any reason why the Christ be other than you *and* me – the Christ in both, a conjunction but not disjunction let alone selection, but not as commonality nor as kinship, but as that which renders pronominal difference, the being that thinks, possible – or that some other be granted preferred and revered status, unless special gifts that you and I may not possess, a difference as the cause and ground that perhaps can explain the deeds attributed to the Christ but neither you nor me, ... *and even if this is the case* ... I do not see why such gifts should befall the Christ but neither me nor you or another, unless there is a difference, often neglected that lies in ... *the encounter between you and me and the being of creation but not in creation itself.*

