

**DE-MYTHIFYING MANAGEMENT – AMONG OTHERS - BEYOND DISLOCATION:
IS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EXPERIENCE AND ITS DESCRIPTION?**

PhD Dissertation (Study)

RESEARCH EXCERPTS

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CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUALISING THE DIFFERENCE

1 OBSERVING THE DIFFERENCE

Difference in itself

Jung (quoted in Segal, 1998: 10) has noted that ‘expression can never match the richness of the vision and can never exhaust its possibilities’. Such a mismatch is for Richards (2001: 42) due to the ‘incompleteness of symbols’, an imperfection that is not only obvious, but also ‘not repairable’. There is always a gap. This ‘perennial gap’ (Doty, 2000: 256), is an ‘ontological gap between event and meaning’ (Gould, 1981: 6). It is a difference for Dretske (1995: 6) between our ‘experiences of objects and our thoughts about them’, or simply put, a difference between experience and its description.

This difference arises for Casti (quoted in Chia & King, 2001: 311) because of the impossibility to express in language the nature of relationship ‘between what we see and our linguistic description of the observation’. This is a conclusion that ‘forms the basis for the unbridgeable gap between the real world and our models of that world’ (Chia & King, 2001: 311). For Dretske (1995: 15) it arises from the difference between ‘systemic representation’ and ‘acquired representation’, although both experience and thoughts have the same function, that of representing. The former is fixed by the functions of the system, as the quality of a sensory system that is determined phylogenetically, whereas the way a thought represents the world is ontogenetically determined. The latter changes, as a re-orientation, as learning, which, for Dretske (1995: 18), at the conceptual level, calibrates sensory representations in a finer manner.

Such a difference has consequences. Chia and King (2001: 311) argue that ‘representation as the quintessential organising mode’ is to be understood as an ‘organisational template for ordering what would otherwise be an inchoate and undifferentiated mass of vague sensational experiences. What is generated, however, cannot be claimed to be an accurate picture-image of reality’. Thus, symbols for Segal (1998: 10) not only convey meanings, individually, but also, ‘worse, inadequately’. With Peirce (cited in Grayson, 1998: 40) signification offers only a partial truth otherwise it would destroy itself by becoming identical with its object, because our experience of signification tends to make us believe there is no gap between ‘things’ and ‘words’ to use Foucault (1966: 58). There is thus an ‘inevitable link between representation and deception’ for Grayson (1998: 27). There is a distortion of experience when the difference prevents us to get closer to experience.

We are thus offered solutions to close the gap, to reduce the difference. Gould (1981: 7) suggests the use of myth as an interpretive process. Jung (quoted in Segal, 1998: 10) proposes the use of a ‘huge store of material’, of different ways to interpret and describe experience. Grayson (1998: 41) offers none, since descriptions instead of ‘drawing our attention to the gaps that always exist in representation, encourage us subconsciously to fill in the gaps and then to believe that there were no gaps in the first place’.

Hermeneutics and heuristics of Difference

Regardless of the solution offered or the refusal to offer such a solution, the fact is one: there *exists* a difference between experience and its description. It is obvious¹. Therefore, why even consider it let alone prove its existence? May (1983: 38) seems to be asking a similar ‘gnawing’ question:

¹ A personal comment made by Dretske.

How can we know whether we are seeing the [person] in his (sic) real world, the world in which he (sic) ‘lives and moves and has his (sic) being’, and which is for him (sic) unique, concrete, and different from our general theories of culture?

The answer that May (1983: 38) provides us with is however revealing:

In all probability we have never participated in his (sic) world and do not know it directly. Yet we must know it and to some extent must be able to exist in it if we are to have any chance of knowing the [person].

May raises both a hermeneutic and heuristic issue relative to the difference between experience and its description. The hermeneutic aspect concerns the experience of the other. He also highlights the difference between the way we describe the other relative to a centre, be it the self or society. The heuristic aspect concerns the means for achieving the previous. Unlike Casti and Grayson who stress the impossibility to bridge the gap, May puts forward the idea that we can capture what the other experiences if we are to relate with the other. This is certainly no easy task, although it is a condition for undertaking a hermeneutic and heuristic endeavour.

With May therefore here is hope! We could even venture saying that with May *we should no longer accept the difference between experience and its description as existing there, tacitly as an axiom*. ‘The perennial failure of verbal expression to be adequate to experience and to be an adequate naming of the world’ stressed by Gould (1981: 7) *cannot* be ‘given’ as he claims it to be. We need to understand the difference, thus undertake a number of hermeneutic tasks. We need to attempt to prove that such a difference exists, thus undertake a number of heuristic tasks.

2 DIFFERENTIAL PUZZLE

The puzzle

The first point one needs to address is to understand the nature of the difference between experience and its description as a finding, an “observation” (*constat*). This requires making the notions of “difference”, “experience” and “description” explicit by identifying the signifieds that such signifiers refer to and clarifying their relationships.

It is not uncommon to perform such explicitness by means of a positing, a definition². This task, however, not only is assumptive, but also raises a number of (non-exhaustive) puzzles, which seem, all things considered, to find their expression in one (differential) puzzle³ that concerns the notion of “difference”.

² This has brought about a puzzle as to whether such conceptualisations should be offered or not. Either, to offer them, however general or generous these maybe, in the main text. This can occur for reasons of clarity or convention, to give the reader the opportunity to interact with them, by accepting them fully, partially, or not at all. This is premised on the idea that such conceptualisations are the constituent parts of a coherent descriptive system, as it is shown in chapter 4. Or, to offer them in notes, marginalised and temporary. This is premised on the idea that they are not discrete phenomena per se as it is shown in chapter 7, since the process of generating and using a descriptive system is ambiguous, as it has non-linguistic aspects that antagonise the objective construction of conceptualisations. The solution to this puzzle has been to offer these conceptualisations first and then antagonise their tendency to fixity – exception made for “experience” since its conceptualisation occurs after having identified the conditions for its existence.

³ To illustrate this puzzle, if “experience” = A and “description” = B, this positing produces their difference (because we first define the terms of the relation and after the type of relation). This does not mean that there is an observed difference. To have a difference we must first observe that we have $A \neq B$ so as to have experience \neq description. But if we find that $A \neq B$, A and B are also signifiers, descriptions that signify say X and Y. So we must find $X \neq Y$ to get $A \neq B$ to get experience \neq description. There is infinite regress unless A and B do not signify X and Y but are simply signifieds that are non-linguistic and exterior to “experience” and “description”.

This puzzle stems from the fact that the distinction between “experience” and “description” may occur by virtue of their being *differentially* defined. To illustrate this point, suppose the contrary occurred, that in having conceptualised “description” one chooses “experience” as a priori signifier to signify a signified (by definition). In this case the difference between them stems from the very fact that they are differently and differentially defined (and none other fact). If this positing takes place, if they are made to be different by definition, there is no reason for identifying and discussing the conditions for the existence of “experience” as different from “description”. Therefore, the a priori conceptualisation of “experience” must be avoided. It cannot therefore be referred to as an ‘objectivity’ (Laclau, 1990: 19-21), in that it exists as a discrete phenomenon with particular signified features. Such features have to be established first, since these constitute the conditions of its existence. It is also clear that making reference to “experience” cannot be avoided, since from the moment we identify such conditions, we are coming close to establishing “experience” as objectivity. However, so long as we are in the process of identifying such conditions such objectivity cannot be constituted⁴.

For this reason, the difference between “experience” and “description” must stem from having identified and discussed the conditions for the existence of such a difference. In other words, the puzzle arises because “experience” and “description” are conceptualised in the differentiating encounter of one with the other. “Difference” therefore becomes a definitional consequence, which is the condition for its existence in that *without* understanding “experience” and “description”, the conceptualisation of “difference” is impossible. Put simply, the understanding of “difference” is presumed on the understanding of “experience” and “description”. If this takes place, “difference” cannot signify anything else, let alone itself.

Solution

A way to minimise the effect of this puzzle is to consider that only the conceptualisation of “difference” may inform the notions of “experience” and “description”. Put simply, that the understanding of “experience” and “description” is presumed on the understanding of “difference”. We thus have the following logical possibilities relative to the very existence of “difference”.

If “difference” is conceptualised as non-existing, that is *if there is no difference*, there cannot be a difference between “experience” and “description”. Thus the question of the impossibility of a priori definition of “experience” does not even arise. Absence of difference may mean that there is in all points a coincidence between experience and description, to the extent that these signifiers collapse one in the other in that experience is captured as such. The latter, it could be argued, is indeed the case with signified objects and other (agreed upon) definitional forms. If this is the case, not only is this discussion terminated, which is, we have seen, worth pursuing with May, but also does not explain the presence of a variety of descriptions, be it, approaches, concepts, paradigms, discourses, and myths all pretending to make a claim over experience. Further, it does not explain governed experience by a description a “*myth-ology*”, to a specific and therefore certain way of describing experience, when concepts define experience and its limits.

On the contrary, if “difference” exists as a recognition of ‘there is’ (*il y a*) to use Levinas (1998/1947: 26), that is, *if there is a difference*, we obtain differing conceptualisations of “experience” and “description”. Thus the question of the impossibility of a priori definition of “experience” must be taken into account, which means that the focus here is “*description*”, which is taken to be a descriptive system, whether linguistic or otherwise, whose aim is to capture (and render public) experience. Presence of difference may mean that there is either an excess of signification over experience or an excess of experience over signification. If the former, it means that the descriptive systems in their totality are able to

⁴ And as it is shown in chapter 11 such a constitution is purely and simply denied.

capture experience in its totality, and there is thus coincidence between experience and its description, as the experiential plane is covered by the descriptive plane. Hence, no difference. If the latter, it means that experience is captured neither by the totality of descriptions, nor by a single description. If the former, it indicates that there is room for the construction of additional descriptions. If the latter case, the unitary description has a set of logics that undermines the capturing of experience. From this arises the argument that description is the partial transcription of experience. Again one cannot readily accept this conclusion. If it is *not* the partial transcription of experience, we have a coincidence between experience and description, and taken all the descriptions together, a whole and full description of experience. Again, there is no difference. In case of the contrary, any description is unable to fully capture the experience it purports to describe - it is not its faithful description.

3 GLANCING AT THE STUDY - PURPOSES

Purpose 1

To come close to conceptualising “experience” as a function of “difference” whose existence stems from the particular conditions that a “description” brings about, and in considering that this difference is not axiomatic, we need to establish a number of hermeneutic and heuristic tools to be used throughout the study.

This requires the construction of a method, termed the “*mythical method*”. It is qualified in this manner because it is involved with the construction of a “*myth*” (the present study), as the particular way of organising language to (re)present⁵ experience according to a set of criteria that each myth itself generates relative to the effect sought as the set of logical postulates into a finite entity.

To arrive at the construction of the mythical method, there are two aspects at play. First, there has to be the logical establishment of the statements to make up myth, the process of what can be termed as “*mythical origination*”, which involves the organisation of a series of interrelated logical premises into problematics. In its absence, no description can take place. Second, these logical premises need to be proven logically, that is, arrive at outcomes that show that the statements are either true or false, otherwise we are likely to undermine the coherence myth requires. Here lies the process of what can be termed as “*mythical validation*” whose purpose is to validate the truth of the statements established through mythical origination. It involves a self-directed and an other-directed approach. The former inquires into how *I*⁶ personally experience and describe this difference (in the present study). As these findings cannot readily apply to other persons and therefore know how others equally experience this difference, an other-directed method is used to prove or disprove this is the case, which is first purpose of the study.

Purpose 2

It is worth noticing that in the process of establishing that others also experience the difference, the other-directed approach requires that this experience be described (in the study). One cannot nevertheless be sure that that what is described is the true re-presentation of an experience. A priori this signifies a difference. The contrary too. Therefore one can neither prove

⁵ The reason for adopting this convention is that we need to inquire and establish the difference between presenting and re-presenting as two different moments of capturing experience. This is effected in chapter 6.

⁶ ‘I’ as the creator and describer of the present myth, ‘I’ the myth-teller, ‘I’ the writer – written in Italics. The reason for adopting this convention is to express the importance of the self and therefore attempt to rescue the self from descriptions that tend to remove the self from participating and acting in this world, a concern shared by Vattimo (1993/1980: 41).

nor disprove the postulate that there is a difference⁷. As a consequence of this (epistemic) puzzle, one is left with the findings of the self-directed approach, which cannot be verified unless such findings are presented (through the study). This is *not* tantamount to making a true re-presentation of what has been discovered or experienced. As *my* myth, it is a presentation involving the logical construction of statements and the use of particular vocabularies in the attempt to describe⁸ and explain how the difference between experience and its description occurs, which is the second purpose of this study. It is the recognition of an attempt to come close to understanding “difference”, as we cannot pretend to a complete understanding, since this indicates there is no difference.

Strategy

It is therefore a matter of being convincing. To achieve this, the underlying rationale of *my* myth is that as the construction of this myth unfolds under the eyes of the other, is beheld by the other, the reader, it is logically examined for validation. It is *this* experience, the experience of *my* myth describing the difference between experience and its description, that is examined and validated by comparing what *I* present and what the other experiences.

If the other is then hailed to occupy the subject-position myth has constructed one recognises oneself in the presented myth. It follows that the other (to a large extent) recognises the difference between experience and its description and therefore validates the postulate that such a difference exists.

Conversely, if the other is *not* convinced by *my* myth, there is still a difference between experience and its description. This is because, the way this experience is presented and how the other experiences this presentation, *I* cannot know what the other has captured, let alone that this description is the true presentation of both *my* experience and that of the other.

Purpose 3

Despite that this rationale attempts to maintain (at all cost) the argument that there is a difference between experience and its description, the mythical method tends to reveal that such a difference is not as distinct as one may have thought. It is an ambiguous difference, as is *my* myth that describes this difference⁹. This is not an ambiguity to put us off, and therefore accept the difference as an axiom. It is an ambiguity that can be taken advantage of to propose an approach for displacing the very myth we tend to constitute, to set myth off-centre, which is the third purpose of the study.

To achieve all three purposes¹⁰, the difference between experience and its description is examined in “*management*” seen as the simultaneous and changing process of consumption and production of goods, ideas, language and thought¹¹. The topics range from managing an organisation to managing one’s life, while drawing on a variety of disciplines,

⁷ This is the first critical point of the paper – “critical” in sense of a ‘bifurcation’ (Eve, 1997:272).

⁸ That is, give an account of a process, its “description” (*διηγήσις*) as experienced whose strands are explained as logical consequences to use Copi & Burgess-Jackson (1992: 285), and not provide an “explanation” (*εξήγησις*) in terms of a transcendental cause for the existence of such a process. The cause to some extent, is *myself*, in the sense that *I* have been concerned with such issues.

⁹ This is the second critical point of the paper.

¹⁰ This study is structured differently from typical re-search papers which seek to first construct a theoretical model based on reviewed literature and then seek to test the model. Specifically, it is structured along the following key points. First there is a description of methods of inquiry followed by a literature review on myth and language so as to use the other-directed approach for proving the difference. Next, a discussion of the findings is given as a description of the process that generates the difference since this based on findings resulting from the self-directed approach. Finally, given this structure yields a paradox, a solution is proposed not to solve the paradox but rather to use it.

¹¹ This is a conceptualisation that goes beyond the ‘Camerlist’ influential discourse whereby management is seen as a rational, efficient and productive activity (Sewell, 2001: 182).

in the Foucauldian sense, including philosophy (of difference, language and mind), politics, economics, sociology, psychology, anthropology, literary criticism and to a lesser extent literature.

4 UNDERLYING PROBLEMATICS - OBJECTIVES

Puzzles

As was mentioned before, “difference” is prone to a number of puzzles, or problematics, which underlie the study, whose solution through the mythical method constitutes the true logical premises for constructing *my* myth.

Thus, to find that there is discrepancy between experience and its description, one needs to show that on the one hand a (re)presentational system cannot capture all that is experienced, *while* on the other, distorting experience when (re)presenting it. Both cases are related under *the problematic of (re)presentational function which asks whether a (re)presentational system reduces and transfigures experience.*

Problematic 1

Starting from the former, it amounts to showing that any (re)presentational system leaves a space of signification unaccounted for, a reduction which is an opportunity for an opposite system to arise. The condition of multinary opposition¹² is necessary proof that a particular (re)presentational system cannot wholly (re)present that which we experience. This condition is not sufficient though, because it could be the case that all (re)presentational systems taken together can provide us with a complete description of all forms of experience. One is therefore left with showing that all (re)presentational systems taken together provide us with an *in*-complete description of experience(s). This means that in effecting the comparison between that which one experiences and its description, there is non-coincidence. Put differently, that (re)presentational systems have elements that transfigure experience, and, therefore, all (re)presentational systems taken together fail to capture experience in its totality – if one is able to establish the existence of such a totality. Resolving together the cases of reductionism and transfiguration constitutes a necessary and sufficient proof (and condition) of the discrepancy between what we experience and its description.

One may however ask what it is that reduces and transfigures experience. Having experienced presentations on myth in chapter 3, it is argued in chapter 4 that it is the constitutive set of elements characteristic of myth that reduces and transfigures experience. Each myth has a particular way of organising language proper to itself to (re)present what we experience, according to a set of criteria that myth itself generates. Using the concept “hyperrationality”, it is argued that it is the hyperrational construction of myth that leaves a space of signification that is unaccounted for, giving the opportunity for its multinary opposites to come into existence. Thus, myth as objectivity reduces and transfigures experience by failing to describe experience in its totality in addition to distorting it when this occurs. No one myth is therefore able to describe experience in its totality. Although this proposition is true because *I* experience it to be the case, it does not follow that it is the case for the other. This takes us to the problematic of *(re)presentational empiricism which asks whether the difference between experience and its description as a result of the logic of myth can be confirmed empirically.*

Problematic 2

As it is shown in chapter 5, mythical validation under the other-directed approach is effected by the application of an empirical method in that it involves the posteriori use of evidence. For Copi and Burgess-Jackson (1992: 281, original

¹² ‘Discursive proliferation’ noted by Donaldson (1995: 1) and Foucault (1971: 10).

emphases) such evidence is ‘*sensible*’ in that ‘sense experience is the *test of truth* for all its pronouncements’, and therefore for testing the truth or falsity of the postulate “there is a difference between management experience and its description”¹³. Under the other-directed approach, mythical validation involves categorising and synthesising management myths into clusters of statements about management in questionnaire format. A sample of individuals is asked to establish the extent to which the clusters of statements re-present their own experience of management. The hypothesis that management experience and management description are different is verified when at least one individual says that more than one cluster of statements represents this experience, and at least one individual says that at least one statement misrepresents this experience. That is, no individual is called upon by one management myth only and that all the presented myths cannot summon one individual.

Mythical validation under the other-directed approach poses a number of difficulties though. To start with, *my* ‘interference as observer’ (Nason & Golding, 1998: 236), in that the statements are constructed by *myself*, as observer, although *I* am placed outside the experience of management as *I* cannot experience management the way another does (and this relation is expected to be a mark of objectivity). Therefore, *I* cannot inquire directly into the difference between experience and its description in others. Further, *I* cannot know the extent to which the clusters of statements re-present managers’ experience of management since, as simple a process as is to put a tick on a Likert scale does not necessarily translate an experience. And finally, *I* cannot know the extent to which an interpretation of collected data corresponds to the management experience the data collection method purports to present, inclusive of the experience of the method used for collecting data. Thus empirical methods fail to prove the difference directly because they entail the re-presentation of what was presented, and we cannot know whether it is its true presentation! It is also worth noting that the respondents react to statements that have been constructed as the result of a reduction of myths, according to how *I* have experienced those presented by their authors as presentations of their experience of management. In other words, there is a direct but distorted link between how the respondents experience a presentation, the empirical tool, which is a description that is constructed by *myself*, which is the result of having experienced a description. Again, the other cannot be sure of whether the statements are the true presentation of *my* experience; their existence is at a distance.

Overall, we are therefore inclined to abandon the other-directed approach. Even in relative terms this approach poses a problem. This is because, although one might establish the probability by which a description is different from an experience, such relativity automatically signifies a difference, it assumes difference but does not prove it. We therefore have to resort to a logical method under the self-directed approach for showing the difference¹⁴. This entails pursuing, within the mythical method, the examination and therefore description of the difference by means of an “either-or” logic, which, is absolute. This also entails completing the creation of *my* myth - that started from the very first page of this study - with its systems of thought and metaphors. This takes place simultaneously as proving the difference logically. The starting point for the completion of *my* myth is the finding that the problematic of (re)presentational empiricism raises an additional important question: does presenting or re-presenting experience amount to the same thing? Moreover, if they are different, does the difference between experience and its description amount to that between experience and its presentation or its re-

¹³ The reader is reminded that such difference is neither assumed, nor does it stem from having experienced descriptions. It is a finding of the self-directed approach. Simply put, it is about how *I* experience and describe this difference.

¹⁴ This means that the process of empirically proving the difference is ambiguous in that the outcomes relative to solving this problematic are not distinct objectivities, therefore definable through myth. One could be tempted to conclude that there is contradiction. This is because, on the one hand there is difference, and on the other, we cannot know that there is such a difference since empirical methods are unable to provide us with a reliable method to conclude that there is a difference. As it is shown in chapter 11, through de-mythification, there is no contradiction but a paradox, as the outcomes are logically produced, each on the basis of specified myths.

presentation? This takes us to considering *the problematic of (re)presentational distanciation which asks whether a presentation or a re-presentation of an experience are the same.*

Problematic 3

As it is argued in chapter 6, if one presents an experience while being able to re-present what has been presented through having experienced its presentation, we are in presence of two moment-processes, that of presenting and re-presenting. The former is unconditional, as it is directly linked to experience. The latter is conditioned on having experienced presentation and is therefore subject to communication and perception¹⁵, despite presenting and re-presenting performing the same function, that of linguistically translating what has been experienced, as experience in presentation. We can logically¹⁶ expect then that re-presentation is nothing more than a presentation. Therefore, presentation and re-presentation cannot be differentiated. Yet, since the logic of myth reduces and transfigures what was presented into a re-presentation, it is reasonable to expect that there is a difference in their content and manner of expressing it. Nothing however prevents us from faithfully re-presenting what was presented and meant, both processes being linguistic in that one can easily re-present what another person has presented, or simply put, said.

We are therefore unable to wholly distanciate re-presentation from presentation. Yet, nothing prevents us from separating them – the contrary also being true. Put differently, the distinction that is being made results from having taken *a decision without criterion*¹⁷, that is, on the basis of ambiguity, the favourite terrain of myth whose logic renders familiar. Because presenting and re-presenting are ambiguous concepts, they are free-floating which allows us to treat them to be different by virtue of our having decided so. But we can also postpone this decision until additional elements are at hand. In effect, it seems that the additional element that we need to differentiate presentation and re-presentation, is position. As it is demonstrated, experiencing involves linguistic and non-linguistic elements. The difference then between presenting and re-presenting lies in a difference between the non-linguistic elements involved in re-presentation, which cannot be re-presented but simply presented. Simply put, emotions involved with experiencing cannot be wholly transferred. It follows that although presentation and re-presentation may be equal in form and content, the non-linguistic elements present in experiencing bring about the differentiation between presenting and re-presenting. If this is the case, we need to ask whether experience is interior or exterior to its description. We are therefore addressing *the problematic of (re)presentational positionality which asks how one can have knowledge of an experience when it is outside mythical language since it is through this language that we make sense of our surrounding inclusive of ourselves, an understanding that occurs at the moment of (re)presentation.*

Problematic 4

When it is interior to its description any conceptualisation of this experience is its own description, to some extent different from its re-presentation, but in both cases linguistic. If exterior though, experience must be non-linguistic and it follows that there is a difference between presenting and re-presenting. This means that any discrepancy between that experienced and its description can occur on condition that that which is experienced is non-linguistic. Difference then lies between experience

¹⁵ Hence the process of mythification.

¹⁶ One may argue that empirical proof of the difference between presenting and re-presenting must be established. However easy this may seem, it neglects the fact that the data obtained needs to be interpreted, thus presented, and as it is discussed under the problematic of (re)presentational empiricism, one cannot know whether it is its true presentation.

¹⁷ Any decision without criterion is definitional. For example, there is no criterion for giving the signified tree the signifier “tree”. Yet, when a criterion of differentiation is constructed through myth, a decision with criterion is taken.

as a non-linguistic process and its description as a linguistic process. It is important to note that empirically proving this difference is impossible since anything that is non-linguistic requires translation, therefore presented, and we cannot know whether it is its true presentation. But what if experience is nothing but linguistic? If this is the case, experience is interior to its description, and therefore ceases to exist in that there are no grounds, other than definitional for sustaining this difference, which contradicts (one of) the solutions of (re)presentational empiricism. Therefore, experience *must* be non-linguistic. If experience is non-linguistic whereas its description linguistic and different, we need to address *the problematic of (re)presentational generation which asks, after having described the mechanism for generating myth, whether the process involved with the construction and use of descriptive systems is complete or in-complete.*

Problematic 5

If complete, then we are prisoners of language. If the contrary is true, and considering experience is non-linguistic and exterior to (re)presentation which is linguistic, we can explain the difference between experience and its description as a difference between on the one hand, the moments of sensing as a non-linguistic process and experience, and on the other, apprehending as a linguistic and descriptive process and experience. Sensing is at the same time outside apprehending because it is non-linguistic. But inside of it as well. This is due to (re)presentational interiority since it is described, as it needs a descriptive system to affirm itself, as Laclau (1996: 46) has noted, since its identity is *in*-complete and has to be supplemented by the (re)presentative - whose function, is worth noting, is equally *in*-complete. Being outside apprehending, sensing plays a mediating role in apprehending as it intervenes, as a result of attachment, in the process of myth construction, or “*mythification*”, discussed in chapter 7. Under mythification, sensing has the purpose *to mediate our surrounding in order to be owned*, to enter our domain of awareness, where it meets with sedimented experience. At the same time, there is an attempted correspondence between experience-as-becoming and experience-as-is¹⁸, and when this is perfect, mythification is complete, in that an identity as unity has been constructed and governed by myth. Under such rational and total completeness a myth engages in a battle for supremacy to undermine its multinary opposites or even attempt to absorb them, thus impose its own order and logic. To win the battle, myth makes use of “*mythical technologies*” to entice and recruit members¹⁹, which validates its existence by being used by these members. This entails the construction of logical narratives and categorical hierarchies that Foucault (1966: 86-87, original emphasis) calls ‘*taxinomia*’ to govern in an act of loyalty the behaviour of those who are enticed through overt or covert means to arrive at their end, that being their survival. Myth, it is discussed in chapter 8, uses individuals and artefacts as the substratum for its survival and demultiplication, which, in transporting myth, receive through myth their identity, and an affirmation through mythical language. But given the ‘antagonism’ (Laclau, 1990: 40) between the actual and ideal, there is, simply put, a gap between how we experience our surrounding and what we think of it. As it is argued in chapter 9, it is a lack that we strive to occupy by altering our conceptual maps and actual experiences in our surrounding. As this lack cannot be fully occupied, otherwise we would not have a difference between experience and its description, there are moments of “*in-mythification*”, of *in*-signification²⁰ that undermine the tendency to completeness that mythification tends to fulfil. This takes place when self and other are linked in “*interactivity*”, in a simultaneous mutual “*from-to relationship*” (*προς αλληλους*). But interactivity is doubly conditional in that one is not always in interactivity with the elements one experiences. When it does happen however, the self and the other are mutually or rather, intersubjectively defined, depending on who the other is. And as the other is plural, conditional interactivity becomes contingent and equivocal, and therefore *in*-complete. In other words, when

¹⁸ In the sense of an idealised and presented experience.

¹⁹ Recruitment does not necessarily follow from enticement.

²⁰ These are actually opportunities for undermining the government of myths.

one beholds myth, one is interactively or *focally* linked with the other, there are the moments of signification, of decision. When one does not behold myth, but still interacts with one's surrounding off-focally, there are moments of *in*-signification, of *in*-decision. We are therefore witnessing, in the process of "*ikiosis*", implying the placing of ownership, of bringing home (*οικοζ*), the interplay between mythification and *in*-mythification when one beholds myth. To be more precise, in the process of mythification there are processes that tend towards undermining its very aims, which means that the processes that mediate and construct descriptive systems are *in*-complete. This however does not mean that a description as a system is *in*-complete, even more so because descriptive systems reduce and transfigure experience due to their logic and structural completeness. Even more so that *ikiosis* as the description of a process, therefore a myth appears to be complete. To solve this apparent contradiction one needs to address *the problematic of (re)presentational structure which asks whether the structure of a descriptive system is complete or not.*

Problematic 6

If the former, there is no contradiction and the argument (overall) is flawed. If the latter though, we are in the presence of a tension between mythical completeness and *in*-completeness in mythification that cannot be abated. This does not mean that the puzzle is solved. Rather, accepting it as the result of logical thinking²¹, and therefore as a paradox (and a juxtaposition). Structural completeness, discussed in chapter 10, where there is an established relationship between a mythical content and its signifiers as vehicles of the former, is based on normative criteria myth itself generates. It involves beholding myth. It is a moment of decision, of signification. But since one does not always behold myth, due to conditional interactivity, there are moments of pre-signification, of *in*-decision. It follows that *only* when we behold²² myth, when the conditions of interactivity are satisfied, is the process of mythification operable tending towards structural completeness. But this brings about a functional *in*-completeness in that there is a difference between experience and its description, because myth reduces and transfigures this experience. Moreover, mythification, as is shown, is also rendered *in*-complete. Consequently, any attempt towards structural completeness is upset, and follows that mythical structure is *in*-complete.

The use of the logical method under the self-directed approach has entailed the creation of *my* myth with the risk however that *I* become permanently a prisoner of language. But if we accept that experience is exterior to its description, and therefore non-linguistic, which brings about tensions in the process of mythification, we *cannot* be wholly imprisoned. There must be ways of minimising its effects, the mythical outcomes, and therefore undo the logic of myth. Yet, such a necessity must be established beforehand.

If we do not, we risk falling pray of mythical recruitment and obey to the logic of myth, which, thereby, becomes a myth-ology that structures experience within the limits this structure imposes. Put simply, *my* myth governs *my* experience as reality. Under this light, myth may seem to be untrustworthy (if we are aware of such governance). Conversely, one can argue that myth makes the world meaningful, and thus is trustworthy.

But there is no way of resolving is mythical battle. Rather, if myth is defeatable which means that it has a weakness, one may take the decision to defeat it. But one can also postpone the decision²³. The decision *I* have taken here is to pursue in the direction of defeating them. This is an action that seeks to uncover the moments of *un*-decision in *ikiosis*, where there is hesitation between closure and openness.

²¹ This is used to propose the acceptance of contradictions as a methodological base for formal or informal (re)search, that is, whether academically or in everyday settings in the process of learning.

²² To be more precise one beholds the vehicle of myth and therefore myth in its enactment but not myth itself.

²³ Which actually involves taking a decision and hence the need for criteria, hence of a myth. The step from walking from decision (mythification) to *in*-decision (*in*-mythification) is therefore small but not if one goes through *un*-decision.

5 DE-MYTHIFYING MANAGEMENT BEYOND DISLOCATION

Antagonisms

Structural *in*-completeness means that the mythical content is challenged by another mythical content thereby making some of the signifiers ambiguous as they carry two contents and there is no criterion for choosing between them, criteria being the product of myth. But since the mythical content chooses its own language, some of the signifiers are bound to be different and signify opposing mythical contents as they are opposing terms. These however *cannot* challenge the opposing myth since they are proper to myth unless they are introduced from without myth. Put simply, this is the situation when another mythical signifier challenges the mythical signifier. In this manner, the content becomes ambiguous since it is (to be) carried by two signifiers. There is a crucial difference between these two antagonisms. The former is the product of myth itself, effected by the presence of a binary content arising from the space of meaning myth cannot capture, and is thus endogenous to the logic of myth to hegemonise and win the mythical battle. The latter is exogenous to myth as it has to be introduced from outside.

These antagonisms correspond to strategies, presented in chapter 11, respectively termed “*re-mythification*” and “*de-mythification*”, to deny the possibility of a mythical content to find an appendice, a signifying vehicle in order to sustain itself. This is possible due to the *in*-completeness in mythification where any correspondence, or grounding of meaning is simply and infinitely deferred²⁴ in that mythical signs are inscribed in *différance*, to follow Derrida (cited in Spivak, 1976: lxx-lxxi). They are infinitely repeated but not duplicated, as their grounding is made to be absent. They are temporary, devoid of a being, ambiguous, as they cannot constitute themselves as objectivities when myth is beheld.

Strategies

The first strategy has been developed by Barthes (1993/1957: 135-136) who proposes the construction of a secondary myth, an ‘artificial myth’, to make the first one look naive, a strategy also adopted by Saper (1997: 8). Although it is a perfectly feasible strategy as it seeks to target the mythical content, it is not effective. This is because it perpetuates myth, as it cannot undermine the very foundations myth is based on. That is, those actually experienced signs that have been narrativised and mythified. One cannot therefore undermine a mythical structure from within myth.

Rather, one needs to conceptualise a strategy that takes into account the weaknesses in the workings of myth: the moments of *un*-signification, thus of *un*-mythification, of hesitation²⁵. As it is shown, this is possible only through de-mythification because, only in targeting the mythical signifier are we able to defer the moment when the signified can find a suitable signifier. That is, when myth is signifying, when one beholds myth and thereby myth is beheld, when one is in relation with myth through myth. The end result is that the mythical signifier cannot find a mythical vehicle to anchor itself, not in the sense of an absence of the vehicle, but rather, its deferral.

Specifically, one needs to question those sure signs that sustain myth. It is not merely finding a new signified, because when any new signified begs for always the same signifier, myth is perpetuated to the extent of becoming meaningless²⁶, as argued by Baudrillard (1997: 12), since it loses its referent. This is the aim of de-mythification: to *in*-scribe in the (re)presentational logic of myth those elements that can render it *in*-operable. Not after myth has constituted itself, but while myth is constructed through its relation with myth. The aim is *not* to recover what myth does not capture by describing

²⁴ Otherwise no new descriptive system could be constructed, nor evolve over time.

²⁵ When decisions are taken without criterion.

²⁶ An argument that is found to be nihilistic by Best and Kellner (1991: 127), as theories seem to float in a void.

it. It is *not* about describing what one senses, as this entails its (re)presentation, hence mythification. Rather, *it is about sensing an ambiguity* in (re)presentation, a hesitation²⁷ that takes us away from decision and mythical completeness. We simply *glance at* what we experience through a multiple and plural focality. And it is only an ambiguity that is recovered. Otherwise we enter either in the domain of decision, where its existence is focal, or that of *in*-decision where myth and our surrounding lie outside of us, but cannot be apprehended because not beheld, thus existing off-focally.

Yet, if one defeats myth one gets the impression that language becomes *in*-operable, and ceases to exist. For Barthes (1993/1957: 135) there is still a myth as there is no escaping from it. But this conclusion should not come as a surprise, since with Barthes, there is nothing beyond the word. With de-mythification though, there is *in*-betweenness, a space of possibilities that is beyond words.

²⁷ Here lies a covert purpose of the study: to create a feeling of ambiguity and in-betweenness whether there is a common understanding of this word, this signifier or not; it is not a question of proving that ambiguity exists since the remainder of the arguments show that such proof is in-conclusive because its (re)presentation is in-complete.

CHAPTER 2 RESEARCHING THE DIFFERENCE

6 MYTHICAL METHOD

Components

Having outlined the problematics underlying “difference” we proceed with detailing the *mythical method* not only to “give proof” (*δειγμα εκφερει*) of the difference, but also progressively construct *my* myth, that is logically organise true postulates into a finite entity. To arrive at this, there has to be²⁸, on the one hand, the logical establishment of the statements to make up myth, the process of *mythical origination*, and on the other, the validation of the truth of these statements, the process of *mythical validation*.

Mythical origination

The starting point of mythical origination is that ‘all origin is mythical: the origin is the myth itself’ (Barthes, 2000/1973: 40), and as a method it involves the organisation of a series of interrelated logical premises into problematics. With Deleuze (1990/1969: 54) a problematic ‘is the mode of the event’. This is a singularity with bears upon problems and defines its condition. It is thus ‘problematic and problematising’ (Deleuze, 1990/1969: 54).

To use Deleuze (1990/1969: 54), then, a problematic is an ideal objectivity that needs to be proven logically. That is, arriving at outcomes that solve the problematic. The consequent myth is made up of those logical premises that are proven only to be true. It is a similar method to what Bateson (1972: 405) has called ‘cybernetic’, which considers that alternative outcomes could have occurred under different circumstances. The mythical method therefore aims at mapping out the alternative outcomes, the series of events that ‘resonate and communicate’ (Deleuze, 1990/1969:53), of inter-linked propositions, that are linguistically transcribed leading to alternative outcomes, the *mythic paths*, and the factors giving rise to such events *as if* they would have occurred.

At the same time, the method examines the likelihood of each path to occur. This means that in constructing the series to prove the truth or falsity of the conclusion, one needs to examine the truth or falsity of each element of the series²⁹. Iff one is proven to be false, then the conclusion is false³⁰. Iff this is the case, an alternative series can be constructed to lead to an alternative conclusion, which is again examined and so forth, until only logically true conclusions are left. Each series and related conclusions constitute a problematic to be solved which is itself constituted of para-problematics each being a conclusion to be reached through a series of events, and so forth.

It is important to note that the series of events and conclusions constituting a problematic are *not* taken for granted: they are constitutive of a myth, which organises language according to the conclusion to be reached³¹. Therefore the solvability of each problematic needs to be established beforehand. Thus, when solvability is established, a conclusion of a problematic is reached which is the solution to the problematic under consideration.

²⁸ It is a condition otherwise a myth cannot exist.

²⁹ An “either-or” logic seemingly also used by Wittgenstein (2001/1921: § 4.023).

³⁰ To use Copi and Burgess-Jackson (1992: 59) the conclusion is arrived at deductively.

³¹ For reasons of clarity, problematic and myth are not used synonymously even though a myth is made up of the true statements established under each problematic.

Mythical validation

Mythical validation involves a self-directed and an other-directed approach. Marshall (2001: 433-434) has made a similar distinction, respectively, into ‘inner arcs of attention’ and ‘outer arcs of attention’³².

The former inquires into how *I* personally experience and describe this difference. It is about ‘scanning, for breath, and tracking, for sustained curiosity’ (Marshall, 2001: 433). But as these findings cannot readily apply to other persons and therefore know how others equally experience this difference, an other-directed approach is used to prove or disprove this is the case.

7 SELF-DIRECTED APPROACH

Self-directed principles

A self-directed approach, a concept also used by Buss (2001: 6), seeks to establish on the one hand the composition of each mythic path, and on the other the truth or falsity of the paths. It ‘starts with everyday experience and is concerned with the development of living knowledge’ (Reason & Bradbury, 2001: 2). The essence of the self-directed method is “being” which is about *my* ‘potentialities’ and the affirmation of the ‘existing person’³³ for May (1983: 17, 25), by means of an ‘immanent inspection of essences’ (Husserl, 2001/1990-1901: 135).

To further use May (1983: 53), if one needs not only to study the person’s experience but also the person qua individual, to become a formal method of inquiry, the self-directed approach requires the definition of the object of inquiry, which is none other than *I, myself* or oneself. Prima facie, there is equation between the object and subject of the inquiry given that *I* am both that being searched and the searcher³⁴. For Clegg and Walsh (1998: 212-213) this does not seem obscure because *myself* as the searcher, *I* am part of the phenomenon observed. Further, *I* am also the person presenting both the inquiry and its findings, hence making a description of what *I* am experiencing in and by this inquiry. Here however, we cannot assume equality, even if we consider that the self-directed approach involves a ‘reflexive process’ (Rowan 2001: 121) in which *I* am a participant with the dual commitment to improvements in practice and advances in theory. If one uses the argument made by May (1983: 122) that ‘self implies world and the world self’, one can consider, in parallel, that the experience of *I* and the description of *I* are dialectically (and asymmetrically) related.

With “experience” as an objectivity-to-be and “description” as an objectivity, it is possible to examine the relationship between the experience of *I* as being both informed and informing the description of *I*, in four strands, without being led to assume their correspondence.

Self-directed dialectics

The first strand of the relationship to be examined is that the description of *I* is informed, verified, by the experience of *I*. In this case, we use our *sedimented experience* (*εμπειρία*), our personal ‘tacit knowledge’ (Polanyi & Proch, 1975: 31) to

³² Tobert (2001: 251-256) distinguishes between first person, second person and third person research/practice. Although the difference between the first two is clear and similar to that presented by Marshall, the difference between the second person and third person research/practice remains unfortunately enigmatic.

³³ Basically concerned with ontology, often separated from essence and therefore neglected. As May (1983: 51) points out, death can be statistically explained which is an essentialist proposition which unfortunately neglects an existential fact, which matters most of us, that we face death alone.

³⁴ Further to the distinction between presentation and re-presentation that is discussed in chapter 6, the signifier ‘search’ is here used when a self-directed method of inquiry is under question. The signifier ‘re-search’ when an other-directed method is the topic of discussion. The latter involves re-searching into what an individual has presented, has described into a myth, given that the construction of a myth involves, to some degree, the conscious inquiry of who we are, an identity into becoming, which is akin to applying the self-directed method it is here described.

assess the mythic paths. Hence, sedimented experience is being used as a criterion³⁵. Hence a ‘deductive’ approach to inquiring into action (Gill & Johnson, 1997: 28; Popper, 2002/1935: 7), which is, according to Hjelmslev (1961: 12-13), analytic involving the progression of the general to the particular³⁶. This is not sense experience or a confrontation through senses with particulars, as Eikeland (2001: 150) claims, but a result from dealing with particulars, with the mythic paths. For Popper (2002/1935: 4, 11, 13-14)³⁷ this approach provides a suitable ‘criterion of demarcation’ for distinguishing physical from metaphysical phenomena³⁸.

At the same time, sedimented experience is put into question and verified. This is what May (1983: 46) seems to claim when stating that one needs to question assumptions, to ‘widen one’s blinders’ if one is to come closer to experience, especially if one considers that assumptions are socially established following Gramsci (1971: 333). But if one agrees with Reason and Bradbury (2001: 5) who argue contra Kant that it ‘is now difficult to sustain a position of ‘naïve realism’’, a phenomenon inquired upon can no longer be considered to exist outside our construction of it, its description. And if one follows Lewin (cited in Gustavsen 2001: 17) that an experiment of action inquiry must only express theory in a way that the results of the experiment can feed back to the theory³⁹, the experiment must be the expression of a theory. These two arguments point towards the idea that concepts not only determine how much (of a) reality an observer can observe, but also establish whether what is observed is pertinent to the question investigated. And given the ensuing primacy of our representations of a social phenomenon, the description of *I* informs, directs the experience of *I*⁴⁰. The obverse is synonymous: the experience of *I* is informed, generated, by the description of *I*.

The fourth strand of the relationship to be examined is that the experience of *I* informs generates the description of *I*. In this case, one uses the mythic paths to progressively construct a myth as sedimented experience. We thus move from the particular, the ‘noticed’ to use Cassirer (1953/1946: 38), to the general, which is a synthetic process as Hjelmslev (1961: 12-13) has pointed out⁴¹. The self-directed approach is, therefore, ‘inductive’ (Gill & Johnson, 1997: 33) in the sense that it allows the becoming of a myth, the description of *I*. That is, a number conclusions are progressively reached to constitute a myth from observing how *I* react to *my* environment, to *my* experience of it, and try to make sense of it. Marshall (2001: 433) makes this explicit: it is an open frame wherein *in*-quiry is *in*-scribed and involves making judgements about when to be focused and directed and when to be open and receptive.

The self-directed approach then is both an a priori and a posteriori approach⁴², but does not consider that a priori knowledge is ‘within us from birth’ (Campbell, 1986: 27). As a participant with the dual commitment to improvements in practice and advances in theory, the self-directed method allows *me*, on the one hand, to construct a myth through synthesis,

³⁵ For Popper (2002/1935: 17, original emphasis) experience ‘appears as a distinctive *method* whereby one theoretical system may be distinguished from others’.

³⁶ Copi and Burgess-Jackson (1992: 59-61) however seem dissatisfied with this way to distinguish deduction from induction. They propose as a criterion the degree of closeness between the premise and the conclusion, in that under deduction the relationship is strict in that if an argument is valid and its premises true, the conclusion must be true. With induction this relationship is less strict in that if an argument is valid and its premises true, the ‘conclusion is more likely to be true than false’.

³⁷ The so-called ‘problem of induction’.

³⁸ The so-called ‘problem of demarcation’.

³⁹ As Pasmore (2001: 39) explains, the merit of this argument is to consider the behaviour of an individual as a function of both personality and environment, challenging the Freudian discourse that deep-seated aspects of the personality can explain behaviours.

⁴⁰ Such claims, overall, falling within the ‘interpretive paradigm’ according to Burrell and Morgan (1979: 28-32), tend to place the primacy of the description of *I* over the experience of *I*.

⁴¹ Without adhering to this approach.

⁴² Campbell (1986: 27) uses the same distinction to understand the a priori construction of knowledge about space and the a posteriori knowledge from experience, when Apollo landed on the moon, a confirmation of the a priori postulates.

the making sense of *my* experiences. On the other hand, to verify whether the statements and conclusions composing *my* myth make sense, that is, are true, for *myself*.

Self-directed methods

Engaging in inner arcs of attention for Marshall entail understanding one's own development, as inquirer, to notice oneself perceiving, or rather experiencing the moment. Further, making meaning, framing issues, paying attention to one's assumptions, repetitions, patterns, and dilemmas. One works with a 'multidimensional frame of knowing; acknowledging and connecting between intellectual, emotional, practical, intuitive, sensory, imaginal and more knowings' (Marshall, 2001: 433). The underlying rationale is self-awareness or a process of becoming mindful⁴³, an 'act of observation' (Popper, 2002/1935: 79), which is recorded in a diary to take notes of ideas, feelings to be enacted in a narrative for Marshall (2001: 433, 435). Let us briefly examine each in turn.

For Symon (1998: 94) a diary study 'allows access to ongoing everyday behaviour ... which allows the immediacy of the experience to be captured'. However, Marshall (2001: 433-434)⁴⁴ finds that this method, albeit useful and used by herself for taking notes of ideas and feelings, has its limitations, because 'any self-noticing is framed and conducted by selves beyond the screen of my conscious appreciation'. Diaries capture only a part of what is being experienced. As Bateson (1978: 438) has put it, with reference to the inability of the television screen to give us a total coverage of the events unfolded, 'the whole of the mind [can] not be reported in a part of the mind'. This is a logical consequence of the relationship between part and whole and we therefore 'have to settle for very limited consciousness' (Bateson, 1978: 438). One cannot therefore agree with Symon that diaries allow experience to be captured *as such* unless one accepts that there is coincidence between experience and its description, even if one presents one's experience to oneself. Although one can agree with Marshall that note-taking enables sense-making or the rationalisation of our experience since this is being described, and what is described forms the mythic paths, the establishment of the truth or falsity of these paths does not follow from such a rationalisation. It is feasible only from within a myth, or put differently, from a set of definitions and rules which can be used as a criterion for establishing whether a series of logically connected events is true or false. This seems to be the role of the narrative.

A narrative, as a method for logically displaying experience, enables the 'entire evaluation of a real-life problem', the present study, with the presumption that one is a storyteller by nature and that 'stories provide coherence and continuity to one's experience' (Lieblich et al, 1998: 3-7). For Finnegan (1997: 77) narratives are a medium through which individuals at every level play a creative role in formulating both their own identities and, by extension, the culture in which they are participants. Further, narratives allow a creativity of selection, addition to, and interpretation of remembered core facts of life, as noted by some observers (Lieblich et al, 1998: 8; Finnegan 1997: 78; Kumar, 1999: 107). An inquiry in one's narrative, and by extension into the paths composing them, therefore enables the investigation of one's inner world, moreover one's identity and personality, since narratives are 'constructed around a core of facts or life events', which are a 'real' and 'historical' core (Lieblich et al, 1998: 8). Put differently, narratives, at the moment of presentation to oneself, consist of two descriptions. On the one hand, that of experiencing the narration itself - at the time of thinking and writing of this study - and at the same time, re-experiencing the fact or event being narrated. For a narrative to be meaningful there

⁴³ This has Buddhist connotations yet if one reads Tobert (2001: 250-252), an effective first-person research and practice, being rare, is achieved, amongst other methods, through meditation.

⁴⁴ Marshall feels this is a highly contentious notion because one cannot claim absolute self-awareness. As it is argued in chapter 10, one cannot know more than what is being made conscious and therefore one should be speaking of focality, the moment when one's attention is focused.

must therefore be at least an equation between experiencing and its description at the moment of narration. However, there cannot be an accurate description of the re-experienced fact or event, let alone the accurate description of the experience of narration. This is also acknowledged by Lieblich et al (1998: 8) who seem aware that narratives are not accurate (re)presentations of reality, or rather, of one's experience⁴⁵.

Action search via diaries and narratives are part of what Marshall (2001: 438) has coined as 'inquiry as life process', akin to what Rodriguez and Ryave (2002: 1) have labelled as 'systematic self-observation' as it is 'an ordinary feature of everyday experience'. It involves 'training informants to observe and record a selected feature of their own experience' with the purpose of producing accurate descriptions of the one's experience without deviating from one's natural behaviour (Rodriguez & Ryave, 2002: 2). This is achieved by writing field reports which consist in a 'detailed description of the actions and words spoken, along with any background information, thoughts, and emotions that encompass the phenomenon' (Rodriguez & Ryave, 2002: 2). That is, the use of diaries and narratives as self-interviews and the transcription of the latter into the former. In this way one has access to a number of covert elusive and personal experiences, first-hand accounts which are impossible to capture by means of traditional participant and non-participant observation methods, which are second-hand accounts, made by the observer. This is even more relevant when the searcher identifies with the observer, as is the case with the self-directed method.

This is also the condition for a systematic self-observation. For Rodriguez and Ryave (2002: 11) the aim of this method is to 'discover the order and organisation that shapes natural life experiences and activities', which involves analysing and making sense the first-hand accounts, the field notes of informants. Put differently, it is about experiencing a presentation in that re-searchers are bound to make inferences about an experience that is not theirs. There is therefore no difference with traditional observational methods. The self-directed approach is however different in that the searcher analyses and makes sense of the first-hand accounts of the informant as self to produce additional first-hand accounts. At the same time, the searcher experiences other first-hand accounts or rather (re)presentations of experiences, which is reminiscent of the so-called 'literature review' in traditional re-search methodology with the purpose of acquainting oneself with the existing available body of knowledge (Kumar, 1996: 26; Hart, 1998: 12)⁴⁶. The difference however between the self-directed approach and the systematic self-observation is that with the former the findings are made by oneself for oneself, whereas with the latter, the findings are made available and thus captured by the observer.

Thus far we have seen that the self-directed approach uses the diary and narrative methods of inquiry for systematic self-observation to establish the content of the mythic paths. However, it does not use them for establishing the truth or falsity of these paths, because this implies the use of criteria, of an already constructed myth.

Self-directed verification and falsification

To therefore establish the truth or falsity of the mythic paths, and ultimately establish the difference between experience and its description, one might attempt to verify each path. One can also effect the obverse strategy, considering that to verify or falsify statements is equivalent.

But Popper (2002/1935: 18, original emphases) considers that 'not *verifiability* but the *falsifiability* of a system [should] be taken as the criterion of demarcation'. The mythic paths and therefore myth must be able to be refuted by

⁴⁵ Both experience and its description are, so to speak, real, as they are objectivities.

⁴⁶ This requires the systematic application of referencing systems and quotations for substantiation or contradiction relative to the themes and issues raised. For Baudrillard (2001: 24-27) referencing and quoting are part of a journalistic strategy, because a quotation is never innocent, it is a weapon, and both reference and quotation, thereby, lose their original meaning. Anything that is borrowed or taken is therefore contestable and an imposture if one lives under a discourse of truth. For Baudrillard then re-presentations need to be experienced, and act as stimulation for one's own thoughts.

experience, which is *immediate* with the meaning ‘immediately given’ (Popper, 2002/1935: 76), therefore unique and not universal. For Popper (2002/1935: 81) there is only one way to make sure of the validity of a chain of logical reasoning. It has to be in a testable form, that is, broken up into smaller steps, in a manner that it is easy to be checked logically and mathematically⁴⁷. In other words, one needs to construct ‘basic statements’, which ‘have the form of singular existential statements’ (Popper, 2002/1935: 84), that is, capable of asserting that an observable event is occurring in a particular location and time. ‘Thus the basic statements’, for Popper (2002/1935: 67)

play two different roles. On the one hand, we have used the system of all logically possible basic statements in order to obtain with its help the logical characterisation for which we were looking—that of the form of empirical statements. On the other hand, the accepted basic statements are the basis for the corroboration of hypotheses. If accepted basic statements contradict a theory, then we take them as providing sufficient grounds for its falsification only if they corroborate a falsifying hypothesis at the same time.

Put differently, we need to assume there is equation between experience and its description and attempt to falsify this assumption by falsifying established mythic paths. Yet, it may not be a better strategy.

If one assumes for a moment that language perfectly transcribes what we experience, to falsify this hypothesis one needs to find at least one instance, one mythic path, that this is not the case. This means finding two different mythic paths within the narrative of the same person, *myself*, corresponding to the same experience. This can be proven by default, which means that in the absence of any external verification and therefore judgement, as we cannot experience what others do, there is a fifty per cent chance that there is one experience corresponding to two mythic paths. Thus in constructing two mythic paths of the same issue and by showing that they are different, one can show that two mythic paths correspond to the same experience. The same logic can be applied to the sum of established mythic paths that is, of myth. But as the contrary has been assumed, one can prove, albeit logically, that there is a difference between experience and its description. There is however a fifty per cent chance that one is wrong arriving at this conclusion. It could be the case that the two mythic paths are consciously constructed, which is a bias that can be argued against the above reasoning. It could however correspond to two different experiences. Again this can only be proven by default since *I* am the only person who can judge whether it is the case or not. Arguably, a fifty per cent chance is very weak to falsify the hypothesis that language perfectly transcribes what we think and feel, as there is a fifty per cent chance that *I* am wrong. This means that the one instance that we need to falsify the hypothesis may happen or not by fifty per cent. It may also be the case that, even if the one instance *does* occur, we are still wrong by fifty per cent in identifying a difference between experience and its narrative, thus a probability of 0.25 assuming that both events take place. But there is also a 0.25 probability that we are correct!

Therefore, we have the same chances of proving and disproving that experience is different from its description if we use the self-directed approach. This may be an explanation why this difference is with Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson (1990: xv) de facto accepted as they consider that words are ‘basic protocol statements of what people believe is happening to them, even though words are necessarily imperfect representations of states of consciousness’. Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson however fail to provide any empirical proof that this is really the case. Thus one can say that the choice between accepting or rejecting the difference has become axiomatic or ontological⁴⁸. But choosing between accepting or rejecting the difference does not prevent us from deciding the argument that “experience is different from its description” is both at the same time right and wrong - or even not wanting to consider it at all! This is because of the absence of criteria necessary for

⁴⁷ This is equally applicable to empirical statements.

⁴⁸ Which means assumptive, as an agreed-to-be-true definition.

checking external validity (Gill & Johnson, 1997: 128; Kumar, 1999: 7). This means that *we* choose and define the choice between accepting or rejecting the difference on the basis of criteria that *we* have set.

Some may however argue that criteria, or rather their definition, are socially set and therefore one's ontology and choice are 'socially determined' (Smith, 1998: 149). However, this view neglects that as individuals *we* are able to take decisions with and without criteria. That is, set definitions for ourselves which may not correspond to what is socially agreed upon or considered acceptable, or even imposed upon us - here actually lies the difference between myth and myth-ology. Further, it is often neglected that it is the definition that we set for ourselves, which has found its way into a narrative, a myth, that has subsequently become a social narrative since it is rendered public, that has become the cannon for judgement. Nothing prevents one from doing this again and again⁴⁹. There are therefore at least different myths corresponding to individual experiences, even if a coincidence between experience and description on an individual basis is assumed.

The above arguments show that since we have the same chances of proving and disproving that experience is different from its description if we use a self-directed approach, neither verification nor falsification are satisfactory strategies. This puzzle arises from the fact that whether *I* verify or falsify what *I* experience is not of importance given the absence of criteria. This means that either we have to have a set of criteria, or myth, or that the criterion for truth and falsity lies elsewhere. The former is impossible, since my myth is under construction. There is one possibility then.

Self-directed truth and falsity

Under the self-directed approach the truth or falsity of mythic paths, and by extension, of their logical coherence and composition, is *intuitively* determined.

Prescience, one can argue with Jung (1968: 43), is a specifically formed motivational force with specified goals. It is 'a process of coming to know' (Reason & Bradbury, 2001: 6-7) that is manifested in symbolic images to follow Jung (1964: 69) again. Henry (2001: 55) emphasises that it is about simultaneously working on a number of different issues, which are 'complex, messy and ill-structured, the information is incomplete, the time required to make the decisions is limited and the outcome of the decision is uncertain'. Under such conditions for Henry (2001: 49, 55), intuitive thinking relies on unconscious patterns. Although her argument emphasises implicit or tacit knowledge, neglects the point that anything that is unconscious, which is thought about, becomes conscious! Henry (2001: 55) goes on emphasising that intuition involves 'apprehending rather than analysing what is going on'. Apprehension however is about making sense of one's surrounding, that is analysing and synthesising events and actions, which makes use of sedimented experience. Simon (quoted in Henry, 2001: 56) is closer to this conceptualisation when claiming that 'it is the direct by-product of training and experience that have been stored as knowledge'. Intuition is not, therefore, a feeling of conviction since it cannot justify a scientific statement, to use Popper (2002/1935: 24). He however neglects the underlying processes of myth generation⁵⁰. Intuition is therefore a perceptual experience that undergoes logical scrutiny, in that both conviction and sensing are sensed of, logically.

Therefore, the self-directed approach seeks to enact an internalised personalised circuit, a lived experience in becoming⁵¹. This is precisely the method used by May (1983: 25, original emphasis) with a concern for not just the

⁴⁹ We therefore become mythmakers or 'masters of metaphor' as Aristotle (Poetics, 1459a 5-6) has put it, because 'it is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others'.

⁵⁰ And hence implicitly separating myth from science.

⁵¹ But we can also have the case of analysing the narrative of the self-directed method, which is achieved through the process of de-mythification.

individual who is described out of accepted delineations, that is institutionalised, but rather ‘*the one to whom ... experiences happen*’⁵².

Self-directed cogito

What is more striking is the method used by Descartes (1960/1637: 33-34) to develop and propose a number of precepts usually found in other-directed methods. Descartes is concerned with applying a critical method, that of passing judgement on himself, while seeking ‘scepticism’ (*défiance*) rather than ‘assumption’ (*présomption*). Descartes (1960/1637: 49) argues that to claim anything to be true requires there is proof that this so. Related to this, to subdivide problems to facilitate the search of solutions, to set an order in thought from the simpler to the most complex, and finally, to effect revisions on a constant basis. Describing his own experience, Descartes (1960/1637: 33) claims that this method has enabled him to increase progressively his knowledge and to reach the highest point that his spirit and duration of life could enable him to reach.

Yet Descartes (1960/1637: 67, 74-75) questions the truth and falsity of propositions found through this method, given that one apprehends only an idea of an external reality but never reality itself. As Popper (2002/1935: 7) points out it is not a question of fact but of justification. Even more so with the split of the body from the spirit since with Descartes (1960/1637: 67) the former appears different from the way we perceive it via our senses, which is located in the latter. Yet the world of thought includes the faculty of reason, which enables us to correct the deceptive image of the world supplied by our senses and construct a true scientific model of the physical world.

The solution Descartes (1960/1637: 65-67) proposes lies in the link between a clear idea of one’s thought and one’s existence. Put simply, that the existence of an idea is dependent on making it clear. This is why Descartes (1960/1637: 107) is concerned with making public his method and findings – hence the present study relative to *my* findings.

Self-directed publicness

The moment the self-directed approach or its findings become public, that is, described, it becomes participatory⁵³ in that as a method it is ‘situated and reflexive’, and ‘explicit about the perspective from which knowledge is created’ (Reason & Bradbury, 2001: 6-7). Using Popper (2002/1935: 22) the self-directed approach is intersubjectively *tested* involving a mutual rational control by critical discussion, hence an ‘explanatory’ type of inquiry (Kumar, 1999: 9). In brief, a self-directed approach enables one to participate in one’s world so that the reality experienced is a *co-creation*, a mutual influence on our thinking and acting, an intersubjective process that is none other than the process of mythification of myth construction.

During this process, there is the construction of a unique and personal form of knowledge and skills, contra Heron and Reason (2001: 183) who claim that there is formation and congruence of four different types of knowing. Namely, an ‘experiential knowing’ arising through face-to face encounters with the other, place or things, a ‘presentational knowing’ emerging from experiential knowing and providing the first form of meaning expression and significance, a ‘propositional knowing’, through ideas and theories, and last, a ‘practical knowing’ expressed in skill and competence. This is because, although the distinction between experience and presentation is valid and that the latter stems from the former, there are no

⁵² Reference is also made by May (1983: 69) to Freud whose analysis of dreams has been almost entirely based on his own experience. However, for May (1983: 15), Kierkegaard seems to be closer to using a self-directed method than Freud, in that the former *knows* psychological problems whereas the latter *knows about* them. For May this is not a semantic distinction: it is a difference in how others are looked upon when carrying out a scientific (re)search. It is the difference between the self-directed and other-directed method.

⁵³ However, contra Reason and Bradbury (2001: 7) one can argue that a participatory view does not compete with positivist thinking and deconstruction, in that it shares the logic of positivist thinking and the undoing-redoing feature of the latter.

grounds, except typological, to accept the claim that there are two different ways of knowing, since an experience is presented. The same applies to practical knowing. Finally, ideas and theories, as constituents of myth are based on language and are therefore a description of experience: they are not a different form of knowing but one and the same. Overall then, the self-directed approach results in the construction of a myth as a description of an experience, which is a unique and personal form of knowledge and skills - as is any form of description, any public presentation of an experience.

Yet the rendering public of this approach or its findings is *not* tantamount to making these true. Such descriptions need, according to Callicott (2002: 168), 'to be brought before the tribunal of the law of non-contradiction'. To assure non-contradiction according to Hjelmslev (1961: 15-16) a description aiming at providing a procedural method must lead to knowledge, to the comprehension of the object in question. In other words, the aim of a description is to explicate a method of procedure for knowing a given object. But at the same time Hjelmslev (1961: 16) notes that the description must be organised in a way to enable us to know all related objects, that is, it must be general, to arm ourselves to meet any eventuality. Using Hjelmslev (1961: 16-17), the object of the self-directed approach is individual experience, aiming at providing a procedural method by means of which a given experience can be comprehended through a self-consistent and exhaustive description. It must moreover indicate how any other experience can be understood in the same way, that is furnish us with tools that can be used on understanding *any* experience, in general. Yet this entails ensuring the applicability of the self-directed approach, which necessarily presupposes its description. Or does it?

Although the description of the self-directed method leads to a procedure, it does not guarantee its applicability as predicted by the description. This is because, as a description, it is differentially experienced. Even assuming a coincidence between experiencing the self-directed approach and describing the self-directed approach, in that one is able to fully grasp *my* experience of this method through its description, contingencies may not allow the applicability of the method as intended.

In any case to prove that language fails to capture the full dimension of all the thoughts and feelings we have, one is still faced with one major difficulty. Namely, the description of one's experience for oneself in that one cannot ensure that what is put in words is really that what one has experienced.

Stretching the self-directed approach

The problem, a priori, with the self-directed approach, if one follows Schutz (1967/1932: 29), is that it has a methodological weakness in that any person risks taking for granted the meaning of one's action as being self-evident. Thus, if *I* ask *myself* what the motives are for claiming a difference between experience and its description, *I* take this self-evident meaning as *my* point of departure and then look for past experiences that are relevant to *my* action or for future events toward which *my* action is conducive.

It can, therefore, be said that *I* must already know the intended meaning of *my* action before *I* may inquire about the motives. In other words, *I* assume the difference a priori. Since the self-directed approach considers that the object of inquiry is *myself*, and if one follows Hjelmslev (1961: 13) that the object determines and affects the theory, there is a need for external verification. A related aspect is that *my* findings on *myself* are not verifiable.

The solution⁵⁴, however, lies in the workings of this puzzle.

⁵⁴ Which is presented in chapter 5.

8 OTHER-DIRECTED APPROACH

Other-directed principles

Overall, as the findings the self-directed approach cannot readily apply to other persons and therefore know how others equally experience this difference, an other-directed approach is used to confirm experience reduction and experience misrepresentation by language as it is experienced by others, and vice versa. In this way *I* can know that what is valid with apodictic certainty for *myself*, is valid for others. This means that, as the object of inquiry under the other-directed approach is the other, there is separation between the object and subject of the inquiry given that *I* am the searcher and the other the re-searched.

Following Rowan (2001: 117-118), re-search, which, as a process, starts from a problem, the difference between experience and its description, invites us to get more information, survey literature as to the possible ways of action. To this effect, the insights produced from examining myth as discourse are used to experience a number of management myths so as to summarise them into key concerns, unifying themes underpinning these myths. Thus far the self-directed approach is at play. The other-directed approach proper involves setting out by a project, a plan of action for investigating the difference in other persons, which is abandoned at some point to encounter reality, the other. Finally, what is encountered and learned is made sense of, which involves experiencing the findings of the inquiry.

In other words, the other-directed approach involves on the one hand, strands of the self-directed approach, and on the other, collecting evidence for testing the truth or falsity of the postulate that there is a difference between experience and its description⁵⁵. The latter is for Kant (1998/1781 & 1787: 255) the a posteriori construction of knowledge, a ‘deductive’ method for critically testing the postulate so as to make a number of conclusions which are not universal but singular (Popper, 2002/1935: 4-7, 9). There is moreover double deduction, if one uses Hjelmlev (1961: 13) that deduction involves ‘a progression from class to component’, that is, analysing and specifying.

Other-directed methods

To experience how myth operates in addition to showing the difference between experience and its description, the discipline of management is considered. Experiencing such myths involves uncovering the unifying themes underpinning them, that is, their key concerns. Their being summarised into key concerns, based on the insights on myths and their functioning, is tantamount to their ‘operationalisation’ (Gill & Johnson, 1997: 29). In the process of summary construction, a number of statements are selected in a manner to mirror the key concern under question. These statements are then set in questionnaire form, so as to give respondents the opportunity to experience for themselves, to interpret what is written (Kumar, 1999: 110), the different statements outside *myself* – but not necessarily independently of *myself* as will be shown.

Thus, to identify the difference between management experience and management description by means of the survey, it is necessary to show that myth as objectivity first, reduces experience and second, transfigures experience. Starting from the former, it amounts to showing that myth is not sufficient to capture experience in its totality, hence a tendency towards constructing additional myths translated by a cluster of statements. At the same time, a search for an additional description can be seen as the tendency for setting out a hierarchy that reveals the dominance of some myths over others. But since one cannot assume that the dominant myth is able to capture experience in its totality, there must be either a lack or a transfiguring logic. If the former, myth is not coherent and if the latter, it means that in effecting the comparison between

⁵⁵ Which follows the tenets of the ‘nomothetic’ paradigm (Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 6-7).

that which one experiences and its description, there is non-coincidence, and thus descriptions cannot cover the space of experience.

Stretching the other-directed approach

The problem, a priori, with the other-directed approach is that theories or rather management myths are constructed by people external to how the sample respondents experience management. Put differently, respondents experience the statements about management according to how *I* have experienced the presentation of management myths, since *I* deduced the statements. How others experience a presentation is a function of the description constructed by *myself*, which is the result of having experienced a description.

An additional problem is expected to lie with the re-search tool, since it is a description, or rather an agreement with a presented experience⁵⁶. This is because the respondents experience the statements about management, that is, reacting in terms of the degree of (re)presentativity of each statement. This can be explained by remarking that these statements have been constructed as the result of a reduction of myths presented by their authors as presentations of their experience of management according to how *I* have experienced their presentation. There is, in other words, a possible distorted link between how the respondents experience a presentation, the empirical tool, a description that is constructed by *myself*, which is the result of *my* having experienced a description. Again, the other cannot be sure of whether the statements are the true presentation of *my* experience.

Further, *I* cannot know whether what *I* describe in the questionnaire corresponds to what *I* experience as presentation. This is also a point made by Csikszentmihalyi, and Robinson (1990: xiv) who are interested in understanding what experience means to the people who have had it and thus adopt an interpretive method. Again interpretation implies experiencing what has been presented and not only is there is no guarantee of capturing the experience of interviewees, but there is per force reduction of what has been presented⁵⁷. Thus, the other-directed approach poses an existential problem for itself: the construction of a re-search methodology entails the description of its being experienced.

9 FROM THE OTHER-DIRECTED TO THE SELF-DIRECTED APPROACH

A step away from the other-directed approach

It is therefore expected that the other-directed approach becomes an impossibility, as one cannot know the inner states of other people or of ourselves unless these are described, if we are to differentiate between inner states and outer states as Marshall (2001: 433-434) has done. In more general terms, understanding descriptions of experience and acts, seen as the behavioural translation of a thought, of sedimented experience, is impossible⁵⁸.

This is because to internally perceive an action poses a problem in terms of specifying the intended meaning: although one is able to describe a behaviour, since it is visible and apprehended, one does not know what this behaviour means to the other person. This holds, even if the meaning is rendered explicit. In effect, Schutz (1967/1932: 26) observes using Husserl's distinction between the 'judgement content' (*urteilsinhalt*) and 'epistemic attitude' (*subjektiv doxisch*

⁵⁶ Which raises the question of whether another tool would be more appropriate. So long as the re-searcher has to devise an empirical tool, one can argue that there is description delimited by the re-searcher's aims and governing myth.

⁵⁷ Thus upsetting all efforts made by Csikszentmihalyi, and Robinson to avoid such reductionism.

⁵⁸ In absolute terms – arguably, and as it discussed in chapter 10, in relative terms it is feasible if we accept the argument that we *glance at* experience. Yet this does not imply correspondence between experience and its description: on the contrary, its difference.

setzungsmodus) one has toward the enunciated judgement, that one may, for instance, hold a description to be certainly true or only probably true. Further, that one may merely suspect that a description is true, or one may simply suppose it true for the sake of argument. Or, finally, one may deny it all together.

Although the judgement content remains the same throughout these changes of epistemic attitude, the latter does not. Yet, it is the latter according to Weber (1978/1921: 116) that determines what the utterer means: what is meant when uttered consists in whether one really believes in what one has uttered, or only suspects either its truth or its falsity. And yet this epistemic attitude for Schutz (1967/1932: 26) cannot be determined. We encounter a similar difficulty when we come to the understanding of an act as one could be tempted to say that one understands it by directly observing the meaning of a person's behaviour when one observes the performance of an act. For Schutz (1967/1932: 27), on the contrary, acts have already been understood and interpreted by virtue of their being defined as such. But this can certainly be upset⁵⁹. Understanding the other person's outward behaviour is therefore not enough to establish the variety of possible meanings attached to an act. This means that the other-directed approach is insufficient to draw reliable and valid conclusions. A solution may be to place an act within a larger context of meaning, the context of inquiry itself: the business organisation⁶⁰. But this for Schutz (1967/1932: 27) is not yet the answer since a 'context of meaning need not, in fact cannot, be identical with the context of meaning in the mind of the actor himself (sic)'.

Further, the motive of an action cannot be understood unless the meaning of that action is first known. But it is the respondent who has this knowledge and not the re-searcher: the re-searcher lacks the self-evident starting point, which is only available to the respondent. Under such conditions, meaning generation by knowing the motive seen as 'a complex of ... meaning which seems to the actor himself (sic) or to the observer [as] an adequate (or meaningful) ground for the conduct in question' (Weber, 1978/1921: 98-99), is therefore impossible. For Schutz (1967/1932: 28) one therefore needs additional information, a certain amount of knowledge of the actor's past and future. This is because a motive points towards a series of future events, which are to occur in the near future, in that one's behaviour is oriented towards this end, while one refers to those past experiences, which have led one to behave as one does⁶¹.

One can therefore make with Schutz (1967/1932: 30-31) the distinction between 'observational' and 'motivational' understanding. The former is about experiencing the other in everyday life, whereas the latter does not take as starting point an ongoing action, but the accomplished act⁶². The rationale here is that motivational understanding is based on an established objective meaning, which is merely an indication of the existence of a subjective meaning. This implies that the interpretive understanding that the other-directed approach requires cannot be observational understanding, but rather, motivational understanding. In other words, to understand the difference between experience and its description as described through the other-directed approach, one needs to analyse the motives for having described such a difference. This however does not prove whether the difference exists. It simply shows if at all, the reason why respondents may choose to respond in a given way rather than another.

Yet a motive, or a choice, must be, in any case, communicated, thus be described and further captured, which further moves experience away from its description. One can therefore merely understand an inner state but not explain it according to May (1983: 40).

⁵⁹ As Schutz (1967/1932: 27) points out for "knob-grasping", the person holding the doorknob is not grasping it in order to shut the door but is merely holding it steady in order to repair it!

⁶⁰ Indeed such a variable will have to be controlled, as it is shown in chapter 5.

⁶¹ A motive then is independent of the present time of the occurrence of the act.

⁶² In Schutz's terminology (1967/1932: 30) motivational understanding is not tied to the world of directly experienced social reality (*umwelt*); it takes as its object any action of the more distant worlds of contemporaries (*mitwelt*), or predecessors (*vorwelt*), or even of successors (*folgewelt*).

A step closer to the self-directed approach

One could however argue, that *I* can be aware of *my* own motives, that is, establish them and not take them as self-evident. This is because the self-directed approach allows the construction of a myth by making sense of *my* own experiences, while verifying whether the statements and conclusions composing *my* myth are true for *myself*. Such an approach entails the description of not only *what* the difference between experience and its description is, but also *how* it occurs, if *I* am to follow what Hjelmslev (1961: 11) has called the ‘empirical principle’, that the description must be self-consistent, exhaustive, and simple.

However, descriptive rigour cannot guarantee that that what *I* experience is that what others experience, let alone be sure that what *I* describe is that what *I* experience. This is because under the self-directed approach the truth or falsity of mythic paths is intuitively determined, and *I* moreover have the same chances of proving and disproving that experience is different from its description if *I* use a self-directed approach.

Thus, a priori and as a finding of the self-directed approach, it seems that whether using the other-directed or self-directed approach one cannot be sure to prove that there is difference between experience and its description. Yet, this does mean that since the method for proving the difference is *in-conclusive* that there is no difference. Rather, our inability to prove the difference *stems from the difference itself*. And it is only through the self-directed approach leading to the construction of a myth that one can *logically* demonstrate the difference. Or can we?

CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL VALIDATION

10 SYNTHESISING MANAGEMENT MYTH-OLOGIES

Link

It has been argued that the metaphoric and historic functions of myth as a discursive and symbolic metasemiotic define a unique discursive signature that distinguishes one myth from another. Due to hyperrationality, myth tends to present itself in fullness and wholeness thereby reducing social complexity with material effects and consequences, notably a space and an opportunity for identification with the mythical content.

Yet despite this, myth is unable to capture experience, which *I* shall now seek to establish empirically. *I* therefore start by considering a number of management myths and narratives, and then ask others the extent to which these myths represent their own experience of management.

Capturing management

To capture management it is necessary to summarise arguments made about management into key concerns, that is, establish the unifying theme underpinning these arguments, their discursive signature. As with the conceptualisations of myth⁶³, this requires experiencing the various descriptions that management is about, or should be about, and attempt to render them again, to enact management by re-presenting it, albeit in a different form, which is not unique, since it is a description.

The difficulty in achieving this lies in the difference in focus that each myth presents, in that a different emphasis appeals for a different myth and therefore for a different set of findings⁶⁴. For Elfring and Volberda (2001: 8) however the issue of fragmentation cannot solely be considered in terms of the number of distinct schools of thought. It is therefore necessary to account for fragmentation in terms of either the theoretical dimension underlying the myths⁶⁵, or the methodology⁶⁶. Elfring and Volberda (2001: 11) drawing on Whitley, explain fragmentation, or rather myth proliferation and distinction, to have come about because, as a discipline in the Foucauldian sense, management is characterised by isolationism in terms the criteria for re-search and the re-search procedures. They therefore suggest integration and synthesis to construct a meta-viewpoint. Elfring and Volberda (2001: 12) do however explain that such an approach has its detractors for some favour plural approaches, while others see integration to be desirable and feasible relative to some strands only. The approach proposed here aims to capture both.

The difficulty mainly lies in the establishment of criteria for choosing those factors to facilitate and enable integration. Yet these are supplied by the myth itself since as a totalising discourse with a metaphoric function can only capture that which is described by the particular language in use. Thus, from having experienced management descriptions, it seems that there is a common thread that underlies the management myths irrespective of their focus and applicability – finding resulting from the self-directed approach. As descriptions of management they refer to management as action. It is a

⁶³ Carried out in chapter 3.

⁶⁴ Fenton and Pettigrew (2000: 9) for instance, make an equivalent observation relative to organisational design. Specifically, they argue that this disjuncture was brought about by dissatisfaction with contingency theory and change in interest towards other theoretical perspectives. Yet, the current resurgence of interest in organisational form differs from its predecessors in that there is a blur of the boundaries between structure and process, hence a 'distinctive conceptual break from previous design schools of thought'.

⁶⁵ The dimensions include the type of knowledge (prescriptive vs. descriptive), environmental perspective (deterministic vs. voluntaristic), unit of analysis (individual vs. organisation), research area (content vs. context), and timeframe (static vs. dynamic) (Elfring and Volberda, 2001: 8-9).

⁶⁶ As either being deductive or inductive (Elfring and Volberda, 2001: 10).

mythical action, in progress, that is qualified by a content⁶⁷, a meaning that stems from a particular concern during that action, the management act itself. Yet this implies first, that the distinction between “action” and “act” holds and second, that there is an identifiable relationship between them.

Action and act

Schutz (1967/1932: 39-40) makes the first point explicit by explaining that "action" refers on the one hand, ‘to the already constituted act’, and hence to an objectivity, while on the other ‘the action in the very course of being constituted’. In parallel, Schutz distinguishes between meaning-contents that are already constituted and meaning-contents still in the process of constitution. An act is therefore always something enacted, which can be considered independently of the acting subject and of his experiences, which means that, in contrast to the act, the action is subject bound. Schutz (1967/1932: 40) points out that ‘whereas the act is, so to speak, performed anonymously, the action is a series of experiences being formed in the concrete and individual consciousness of some actor, be it myself or someone else’. It follows that action takes place in time, it is ‘duration-immanent enactment’, whereas act, is ‘duration-transcendent enactedness’ (Schutz, 1967/1932: 40).

Management then as “action” (*actio*) presents itself as a series of existing and present experiences. At the same time management as “act” (*actum*) consists in the terminated, completed acts of management as action, an expired action, which presents itself as a series of terminated experiences which are sedimented in memory and are therefore mythified, idealised. But management also presents itself as a series of future experiences, or experiences-to-be, of intended and idealised acts, since, to use Stacey et al (2000: 14)⁶⁸, management as action is a ‘movement into the future’. Overall, the content then of management action consists not only in the experiences of consciousness while the action of management is in progress, but also both in past experiences and future experiences as idealised acts.

With Stacey et al (2000: 14, my emphasis), management as act is also ‘*the reason* for the movement into the future’, that which causes management as action. Management as act then is the overarching source of becoming, as it is the tendency towards some end, some supreme goal (*τελος*). One can expect then that action be bound to work in one direction, towards the ideal act. If this is the case it means that “action” is the cause for an “act” as effect. To use Black (1962: 196, original emphasis) an action as a procedure is a ‘*conditional performance procedure*’ for an act. An equivalent conceptualisation is made by Ricoeur (1984/1983: 201, original emphases) who considers that causal necessity is conditional: ‘*given* the complete set of causal conditions that took place (and not others) it was *necessary* that the effect that was actually produced occur’. With Hage and Meeker (1993: 76) there must be an original event, the “action” that must have occurred before the end event, the “act”, and there must be evidence that the original and the end events are interrelated in some way⁶⁹.

Causal relation

The latter condition is important because, Black (1962: 196-198) notes, one does not necessarily lead to the other - with the danger of claiming that the conditional adequacy of the procedure follows from the definition of the task - let alone that a given act may have an associated conditional performance procedure. What Black (1962: 199) proposes is to make predictions. That is, predict as to whether “action” and “act” are causally related. Yet if an act is idealised, *as if* it occurred, and therefore described and predicted through a particular myth, one is left with a comparison between the idealised act and

⁶⁷ For Yukl (1998: 22) content refers to both the description of activity patterns, and behaviours.

⁶⁸ Who to some extent seem to integrate action and act under the same concept, that of action, as Schutz does, with the difference that for them, action is teleological.

⁶⁹ Otherwise we are committing the post hoc ergo propter hoc error (Hage & Meeker, 1993: 76; Copi & Burgess-Jackson, 1992: 122).

its reality. Only then can one establish the degree of causal relationship. So long as an act is idealised, the causal relationship is preserved. Under these conditions the action-act causality moves in one direction, there is movement from “action” to “act”. And as Black (1962:183) notes, “direction” and “motion” can only be associated if the former is described ‘by giving two points on the path’. Yet Black (1962:185) refuses the association between “time” and “direction” via their common signified “motion” because in no way can one ascribe a direction to time.

Thus one has two possible movements, namely towards a point and away from a point, which means that, if one considers that “action” and “act” to be causally related, both can be objectivities, and therefore, one can say that an end may be the cause of management as action. But given that a system cannot be reverted in its previous state without expenditure of additional energy, as Hage and Meeker (1993: 76) explain, the two “acts” which are related by an “action” must be different. And it is equally possible according to Black (1962:181) to ‘produce a latter event in order to ensure the occurrence of an earlier event’, where the latter event has thereby caused the former one. What is determinant is control and the identification of a pattern of change between them, that is, an association between “direction” and “change” that also Black (1962:184) has made.

Stacey et al (2000: 14) point out that the end, the act, may be either knowable or unknowable. In the first instance⁷⁰, to use Stacey et al (2000: 21-27), acts may result from the continuous perfection and evolution of previous acts through given forms and patterns of action. Further, both act and action may result from reasoning independently of existing acts and actions. Finally that actions may be perfected independently of acts. In the case where the end is unknowable⁷¹, to use Stacey et al (2000: 31-48), different acts may be achieved under different circumstances in a process of attempting mutual fitness, or they can merely not be achievable as they are in perpetual construction regardless of the actions. For Stacey et al (2000: 197) it is the last case that captures ‘the manner in which goals and values, the motivators of human action, continually emerge in the self-organising complex responsive process’, implying experiencing the material and emotional sources of cause.

N-step guides

With the above insights, descriptions of management action and acts are related by an identifiable cause-effect relationship, ‘where cause is the whole process and the effect the end point’ (Ricoeur, 1984/1983: 200)⁷², hence a condition. There are therefore what Collins (1998: 82) has called ‘n-step guides’. These are myths that play both a descriptive and prescriptive role⁷³ relative to management actions and acts⁷⁴, which enable the integration disciplines, bodies of knowledge and their users.

Their descriptive function stems from the rationality that underpins myth aiming to show ways to solve the problem of management itself, its own conceptualisation as act, in addition to proposing ways to solving problems that management

⁷⁰ Respectively ‘secular natural law teleology’, ‘rationalist teleology’, and ‘formative teleology’, the two latter drawing on Kant (Stacey et al, 2000: 52).

⁷¹ Respectively, ‘adaptionist teleology’ and ‘transformative teleology’ - the former drawing on Darwin and Mead, and the latter on Hegel (Stacey et al, 2000: 52).

⁷² Drawing on Mandelbaum against the empiricist tradition that stems from Hume where the nomothetic character of the causal relation is related to the atomist character of cause and effect.

⁷³ In this way Collins integrates what Elfring and Volberda (2001: 16-17) have distinguished between a ‘clinical research approach’, which is prescriptive and problem-oriented, and an ‘analytical research approach’, which is descriptive and theory-oriented by bringing the former under the latter. Elfring and Volberda (2001: 16-17) however seem to take a different orientation by considering that the latter informs the former.

⁷⁴ This is what Collins (1998: 82) calls the ‘under-socialisation argument’ because such guides fail to acknowledge management, and relative to his concern, change as a social activity that involves people from diverse social and cultural groups who tend to interpret issues and situations in different and often quite divergent ways.

causes as action in a preferential manner, according to its internal logical classification⁷⁵. At the same time, the rationality of management myths is prescriptive because as Collins (1998: 85-86) notes, the n-step guides present themselves as if the method that is being proposed is a tried and tested approach that can optimise the results that managers are looking to achieve.

This also a point made by Black (1962: 228-229, original emphases) when claiming that a model⁷⁶ as '*heuristic fiction*' enables one to work 'not *by* analogy, but *through* and by means of an underlying analogy'. And this is due to the metaphoricity of the myth⁷⁷, due to archetypal conceptualisations, their discursive signature. Archetypes⁷⁸ are for Black (1962: 237, original emphasis) 'a systematic repertoire of ideas by means of which a given thinker describes, by *analogical extension*, some domain to which those ideas do not immediately or literally apply'. He further asserts, rather sees it as a problem, that an archetype may be used metaphysically, insulated from empirical disproof and 'the more persuasive the archetype, the greater the danger of its becoming a self-certifying myth' (Black, 1962: 242). In brief, n-steps, frames of references, presuppositions, that is myths, become *myth-ologies*.

Let us now conduct a mythographic study of myth-ologies of management⁷⁹ a plurality underpinned by typical actions and acts that are described around their discursive signature.

The rational content

To start with, management action is described to have a rational content in that it is concerned with the efficient performance of the organisation in its whole and its parts to achieve organisational purposes⁸⁰. Since profitability is the 'supreme goal of a business' (Whittington, 1993: 11; Collins, 1998: 12-16), the fundamental tasks for managers are twofold. On the one hand, the positioning of the firm in those markets where maximum profits can be earned, and on the other, the rational organisation of the components of the firm in a way that profitability is maximised.

To achieve these goals, the business entity according to Whittington (1993: 11-17) needs to consider management as a controlled process of thought whose implementation can occur only after the planning phase has been completed. There is, as De Wit (1997: 13) notes while assessing Porter's contributions, separation of thinking and acting. The use of rational analyses of business operations and influences enable managers on the one hand, to put in place organisational structures that clarify responsibilities, and on the other, enable staff, as rational economic agents, to complete work in terms of its extrinsic rewards⁸¹. What follows is the scientific organisation and 'study' of work (Collins, 1998: 12-16) inclusive of staff

⁷⁵ In disagreement with the claim made by Hatab (1990: 32) that myths do not employ logical classifications due to their universalising function to reconcile opposites and oppositions. However, language is rarefied and rarefies, thus logically categorical. In fact, Hatab (1990: 34) does accept 'rudiments of classification'!

⁷⁶ Which for Black (1962: 238) is conditioned on an isomorphism with its field of application.

⁷⁷ For Black (1962: 237) 'metaphorical thought 'is a distinctive mode of achieving insight'.

⁷⁸ According to Bodkin (1934: 4) as Black points out. For Bodkin archetypes may not be a priori determinants of individual experience, because evidence that this is the case is hard to evaluate. She does however acknowledge the existence of durable patterns, which may not necessarily be archetypal in the Jungian sense.

⁷⁹ Inclusive of leadership, considering that an individual is at the centre of group action. The view taken by Kotter (cited in Northouse, 1997: 8-9) seeks to separate the manager from the leader on grounds of stability and change. It seems however that for Yukl (1998: 5) this distinction not to hold because whether management or leadership as processes both have an influence on other individuals towards attaining a goal, an act.

⁸⁰ To use Stacey et al (2000: 52) the rational content is characterised by a 'secular natural law teleology' and a 'rationalist teleology'.

⁸¹ Hence the presence of a transaction. The actor seeks to get compliance in terms of effort, productivity and loyalty in exchange for rewards whether economic, political, or psychological. This means that actors recognise the basic needs and wants of followers but given the priority on tasks, the roles are assigned according to the planned outcomes. Northouse (1997: 137-138) and Yukl (1998: 325) point out under the 'transactional approach' that managers are influential because it is in the best interest of staff to do what managers want.

selection since managers know what is best for the organisation in addition to the scientific principles that ensure mutuality and co-operation. There is therefore an emphasis on a set structure of control relations in a bureaucratic and pyramidal organisation that is seen to be highly rational and highly efficient with ‘universal applicability’ (Fenton & Pettigrew, 2000: 10-11; Fidler, 1997: 55-59). This, one can argue, includes the multidivisional organisation, which shares with the previous type the separation of ownership from control while being dependent upon discipline and technical training. It focuses nevertheless on capital allocation in the divisions, and reduced transaction costs by creating an ‘internal’ capital market (Fenton & Pettigrew, 2000: 15)⁸². In such structures all routine matters are handled by staff leaving managers free to deal with exceptional issues where existing rules are inapplicable. This means that managers, who are directly related to organisational goals need not have more staff than they can effectively oversee and that no staff should receive orders from more than one manager. At the same time activities are grouped in the same administrative unit under the authority of managers relative to the established system of work. Its justification is made relative to the ‘charismatic’ features of the manager’s personality (Northouse, 1997: 14)⁸³, in addition to the position held in the organisational structure, both being sources of power. In this way managers as ‘vanguards’ are able to examine the future, draw up plans of action, build up structures and resources, maintain and unify activity among the personnel, and see that everything occurs in conformity with policy and practice to use Stacey et al. (2000: 61).

The turbulent content

But management action is also concerned with the efficient performance of the organisation in an environment⁸⁴. Yet, the nature of environments is contingent in that it is characterised by dynamic and changing activities. For Rosenau (1990: 59-60) these make up after Emery and Trist, the ‘turbulent environment’, one in which the degrees of complexity and dynamism are high. Managers then need to understand and act on the influence of changing actions and acts at a variable speed and complexity, a process of adaptation, which is the supreme goal of a business.

To achieve this, managers need to scan the internal and external environments to understand the self-regulating and self-influencing forces that affect their business. The contingent nature of such forces⁸⁵ is for Rosenau (1990: 65) a source of the high complexity, dynamism and interconnectedness at work in the global system⁸⁶. For McCann and Selsky (cited in Rosenau, 1990: 60), it is a ‘hyperturbulent’ environment⁸⁷ wherein the adaptive capacity of collectivities and individuals is exceeded. This results in the partition of the environment so as to minimise its effects and adopting practices to suit the situation. According to Northouse (1997: 53) such practices require from managers to have both a directive and supportive dimension. The former dimension relates to task behaviours whereas the latter to relationship behaviours, and together combined indicate the tasks to be carried out. It seems however important that managers are able to diagnose the

⁸² Fidler (1997: 59-64) further highlights professional bureaucracies, and matrix structures.

⁸³ Northouse (1997: 17-18) highlights under the ‘trait approach’ essential traits that include intellectual ability, verbal ability, perceptual ability and reasoning. Further, the ability to be certain about one’s competencies and skills, the desire to get the job done including the characteristics of initiative, persistence, dominance, and drive. Furthermore, the quality of honesty and trustworthiness, to take responsibility for one’s own actions, and finally, the inclination to seek out pleasant social relationships by being outgoing, friendly, tactful, courteous, and diplomatic.

⁸⁴ To use Stacey et al (2000: 52) the turbulent content is characterised by a ‘formative rationality’, and an ‘adaptionist teleology’.

⁸⁵ The main cause for turbulence for Rosenau (1990: 51-52, 57) is the rise of different loci of power bringing about changes in individual behaviours and in institutional life and organisation.

⁸⁶ It is both a dependent variable and an independent variable, since turbulence can also be seen as the consequence of the effects its produces. Turbulence both accounts for the dynamism of actors and is in itself dynamic as it reflects change and it can further cause change.

⁸⁷ In this way Rosenau avoids the conceptualisation of change along the binary opposition continuity - change, in that continuity refers to an absence of change, a habit with no breaking points, where cultural norms pervade. Under change there are breaking points with tensions in world affairs seen as perturbations that herald important changes.

developmental level of their staff as well as adapt their style and approach⁸⁸. For Whittington (1993: 17) business entities must ensure their survival, regardless of the method used. This implies that competition is *not* a matter of detached calculation but a constant struggle for survival, which gives rise to the most appropriate acts of differentiation and a concern for plurality in the search of options relative to external and internal pressures in the attempt to achieve planned goals⁸⁹. For Fiedler (cited in Northouse, 1997: 75-76) this means that only certain management styles will be effective in certain situations⁹⁰. Thus managers need to be more supportive, provide instruction, monitor critical tasks and provide more direction to reduce the effects of a changing environment often seen to be discomfiting Yukl (1998: 290-291) notes. But if responsiveness to change is not a function of vision or training, one can argue that it is rather a function of change complexity. Thus managers adopt ad hoc policies when confronted with a larger and often hostile environment which is complex, and uncertain. This also means that the goals of any particular rationally-planned method cannot be clearly known since in planning and managing, managers attempt to match up to the needs of an environment which is poorly understood and changeable. Management therefore is an ongoing activity made to align and re-align the organisation with the environment. Yet this does not imply determinism effected by the circumstances: managers attempt to obtain the necessary resources to challenge their environment. This is achieved according to Collins (1998: 61-62) by means of three processes. Namely, the 'choice process', when managers weigh up and decide upon the nature and scope of the action and on the appropriate focus of decision-making, the 'trajectory process', when managers consider the past and future direction of actions, and the 'change process', when managers detail action. It follows that when faced with external and internal pressures in the attempt to achieve planned goals, businesses have no best way of organising themselves, but there are merely associations between dimensions of organisational structure and contextual factors according to Fenton and Pettigrew (2000: 12-13). For Galbraith (cited in Fenton & Pettigrew, 2000: 16) organisation is simply contingent upon uncertainty and diversity in that the greater the uncertainty, the more information needs to be processed. Hence a network, involving the identification of patterns of direct and indirect linkage among persons and positions. As Lincoln (cited in Fenton & Pettigrew, 2000: 19) observes 'organisations divide administrative and functional responsibilities among positions, then recombine them through a collective meshing of roles to generate an organisational action'. Thus networks arise from an interdependence of individual lines of action, a situation of 'loose coupling' when events or elements are somehow related while being separate or autonomous (Scheerens, 1997: 82-83). This gives a flexibility of response to environmental changes, the possibility for localised adaptation. For Meyerson and Martin (1997: 34-37) the result is differentiation and diversity where there is a collection of values and manifestations and the presence of subcultures reflecting opposite views than the dominant one or reflecting functional, national, occupational, ethic or project affiliations.

⁸⁸ In particular Northouse (1997: 54-56) highlights within the 'situational approach', after Blanchard et al, four styles that include giving instructions and guidelines to achieve objectives (directing). Further, meeting members' needs at the same time as satisfying organisational needs (coaching), and listening, praising, and asking for input and give feedback while empowering members to take decisions on day-to-day issues supporting (supportive). Finally, facilitating members' confidence and motivation by assigning tasks to the members after agreement on how to proceed (delegating).

⁸⁹ Although one can argue that this amounts to a conscious attempt to moving organisational misfit into a situation where the organisation and its contextual contingencies fit, research from Harris (cited in Donaldson, 1999: 104) does not seem to confirm this tendency. Donaldson (1999: 105) explains this to be due to presence of other factors whose effect can only be temporary.

⁹⁰ Situations are described along three factors, namely, leader-member relations, task structure, and position power within the 'contingency approach' (Northouse, 1997: 75-76; Yukl. 1998: 285). Together these factors determine the degree of favourableness of situations.

The cultural content

In addition to the turbulence that characterises environments, management is concerned with the values and moral content of social and cultural practices relative to projected or attained acts within a social framework and its particular way of doing⁹¹. The central role for managers then is to establish a particular way of understanding, structuring, conducting and talking about business life that is unique to an organisation. In other words, managers are concerned with the development of the 'right culture' leading to a more effective organisation (Salaman, 1997: 241-242), which is the 'condition for success' (Peters & Waterman, 1983: 93).

To achieve this, managers need to be aware that the contexts within and without the business entity interrelate, as both are social systems. Put differently, that a business entity and its action is embedded in the social fabric of its environment, and hence belongs to networks of social relations influencing both the means and ends of action and defining the appropriateness of individual behaviour, Whittington (1993: 28-39) notes. It follows that the norms guiding action do not derive from the acts but rather from the cultural rules of the local society which serves the purpose of normalising the structures of a particular culture⁹². The ensuing corporate culture provides staff with a sense of common direction and guidelines for behaviour according to Deal and Kennedy (1997/1991: 273). It also has effects on business performance, in addition to allowing improvements in performance, quality, innovation, and customer relations. Therefore only committed employees can bring about competitive excellence on condition that the personal values of employees can be matched with those of the organisation. Managers need to foster co-operation and commitment through motivation both Marsden (1997: 108-109) and Collins (1998: 107) note, which means giving employees the autonomy to own the responsibility of their actions⁹³. In other words, a transformational manager who seeks to influence the assumptions and beliefs about the world that staff holds so as to become shared, which includes the articulation of an appealing vision, its presentation and justification, and the 'expression of confidence' (Yukl, 1998: 343). Such managers are therefore concerned with shaping the culture of the group according to Schein (cited in Yukl, 1998: 329) a 'culture of teamwork' for Wallace and Hall (1997: 88-89) where values and beliefs relating to norms are shared. These take the form of narratives of events and individuals based on impressionistic evidence to relate to the role(s) individuals play in organisations, and status, the relative position of a person on a socially defined scale of hierarchy of social worth, and expressed through rituals and ceremonies. At the same time, staff conduct is directed in such a way that they perceive the organisation and their work in the same way as managers do Salaman (1997: 251-252) claims. Such a guidance takes place through the use of 'technologies of conduct regulation' (Du Gay, 1997: 294), power sources to reinforce the construction of ideals relative to the success of the organisation. For Collins (1998: 107) this implies the application of knowledge by way of mechanisms, devices and regulatory interventions, including communication of priorities, reactions to crises, role-modelling, allocation of rewards, and staff selection for Yukl (1998: 330-331). Moreover, the construction of a single discourse, a view wherein staff can recognise themselves for Yukl (1998: 333) and Woodward (1997: 42), to internalise the objectives and values of the organisation for Salaman (1997: 237). Managers also need to develop and use the symbolic aspects of an organisation, which is achieved through meaningful and

⁹¹ To use Stacey et al (2000: 52) the culture content is characterised by a 'transformative teleology'.

⁹² The danger is however that one passes from an 'under-socialised view' to an 'over-socialised view' of management according to Collins (1998: 100-101) who seems to imply that the over-socialisation of managerial activities and of change in particular is about the management of cultural change. That is, the management of change is no longer viewed as that of managing a sequentially logical process that is proactive to offset contingencies, but it is deeper as it is about changing the subjective interpretation of change.

⁹³ Following House and Mitchell (cited in Northouse, 1997: 89), adopting a 'path-goal approach', manager behaviours can help staff along their path to their goals according to their needs (affiliation, structure, control, and task ability) and work situation (design of task, authority system, and structure).

symbolic practices that put forward values, beliefs and norms⁹⁴, to ensure, for Nicholson (1993: 208-209), continuity in contingent situations. For Meyerson and Martin (1997: 32-34) the result is integration where consensus is tacitly assumed and asserted or sometimes empirically demonstrated. There is denial of ambiguity since there cannot be more than two interpretations of organisational values. Culture is therefore a monolith that integrates consistency, consensus and hierarchical centeredness into a harmonious organisation.

The emotional content

As Collins (1998: 16-18) remarks, the focus on human relations is based on the premise that staff are emotional, which means that management action is influenced by the emotions that its members have relative to acts⁹⁵. Managers then need to manage the emotional content of staff, their personal values, and not only their rational or cultural content.

To achieve this aim, ‘managers attend to staff’ (Northouse, 1997: 36), that is, seek to provide staff with opportunities that enable the expression of individual values, rather than those shared, because they are for Holbrook (1999:6-7) ‘relativistic’ in that they depend on individual preferences and changing situations. There is therefore a separate exchange relationship with each individual member of staff in the organisation as the two parties mutually define their role – a dyadic role⁹⁶. And when this exchange is positive, there is less staff turnover, enhanced performance, greater organisational commitment, better job attitudes and greater participation, Northouse (1997: 112) remarks. Managers then need to ensure that staff feels they are part of the in-group, and hence leaders should develop high-quality exchanges⁹⁷. This is achieved when managers emphasise equity, provide corrective feedback, explain the adverse impact of incorrect behaviour, and elicit improvements according to Yukl (1998: 158-161). Moreover, staff needs to know what is expected from them, be encouraged to take initiative, inform and verify the accuracy of information received, seek feedback, and show appreciation⁹⁸. Organisations are therefore thought as social units wherein managers promote and cultivate group norms in order to tap the potential for increasing output⁹⁹. For Sparrow (1998: 12-13) it is about managing by perception in terms of a sensitivity that organisational members have for one another. There is therefore a development of mutual understanding and learning where common values arise from the socialisation during training and professional practice, as Bush (1997: 68-69) notes. This implies decision-making based on democratic principles, consensual decision-making and the authority of expertise in an egalitarian-participative ‘collegial structure’ (Hargreaves, 1997: 245-247; Bush, 1997: 68-69).

⁹⁴ According to Yukl (1998: 328) the attempt to change the subjectivities of followers and not simply create a high-quality exchange which can only happen to those subordinates who are part of the in-group is a feature of a transformational action. In other words a transformational actor seeks to influence the assumptions and beliefs about the world that followers hold so as to become shared.

⁹⁵ To use Stacey et al (2000: 52) the emotional content is characterised by an ‘adaptive teleology’.

⁹⁶ A ‘leader-member exchange approach’ (Northouse, 1997: 109; Yukl, 1998: 150).

⁹⁷ A process that Graen and Uhl-Bien (quoted in Northouse, 1997: 113) call ‘leadership making’.

⁹⁸ The dyadic role makes recommendations on staff behaviour, as Yukl (1998: 164) explains, hence a focus on staff. It is however up the manager to encourage such actions, which explains the shift in focus here from staff to manager.

⁹⁹ Team management in the model of managerial behaviour proposed by Blake and Mouton (cited in Northouse, 1977: 38-39), under the ‘style approach’, with a strong emphasis on both people and tasks. It is a style that promotes a high degree of participation while making objectives explicit and getting issues into the open.

The power content

Management action according to Pfeffer (1993: 201-204) is influenced by power, which is not seen to stem from structure, nor from culture. Relative to the former, Pfeffer (1993: 201-202) sees hierarchy as a source of power stifles action in terms of getting things done because to start with it is no longer the dominant view. Further it clashes with situations of co-operation as one depends on others for achieving work-related objectives. Finally, hierarchical decision-making is prone to error that is duplicated in the other levels of the hierarchy. Relative to the latter, Pfeffer (1993: 202-203) sees culture as the source of power for a shared action may not be the alternative to hierarchy-generated power since it takes time to develop shared premises. Even more important though a strongly established culture having become paradigmatic or rather a mythology, may be the very cause for trouble as it is sclerotic.

Therefore, power stems from the very rationality of management action, that is, informed by the very acts that management wishes to achieve¹⁰⁰. Managers therefore need to recognise the varying interests in any organisation that make up 'the political landscape', to understand the various points of view relative to the concern under question. Yet, to achieve the intended acts, managers need to acquire and use sources of power, each qualified by its own strategies and tactics.

To attain this goal, managers need to 'observe' the behaviour of others (Pfeffer, 1993: 205-206). For Morgan (1993: 215) this is the 'hallmark of the pluralist manager'. Managers thus focus on balancing and co-ordinating the interests of organisational members to work within the constraints set by organisational acts reflecting the interests of stakeholders. This also means that management action is a sticky and messy phenomenon, to use Whittington (1993: 22), from where short-term and short-lived acts emerge. Management action then does not tend to evolve on a piecemeal basis, but rather, in leaps and hence is based on adaptive rationality, the gradual adjusting to environmental turbulence as markets can tolerate a degree of under-performance, which provides a sense of direction while allowing for flexibility. This is because managers use their existing position to magnify the given power basis through coalitions, with their own objectives and biases, formed through bargaining over the attainment of a set of objectives. Further, by gaining power over important decisions while undermining expected opposition, in addition to 'institutionalising' views and policies (Yukl, 1998: 192-193). Therefore, management action is located both temporally and contextually where individuals are nodes that are temporarily and selectively connected by shared concerns at a given moment, leading to an uncontrollable dynamic. To use Meyerson and Martin (1997: 37-40) this is a culture of ambiguity where consensus, dissensus and confusions coexist, hence an 'organised anarchy' (Scheerens, 1997: 81). In such a context, conflict is seen as a means to arrive at individual or organisation goals¹⁰¹. In this way the manager accepts the role of organisational 'power broker' and 'conflict manager' (Morgan, 1993: 215) based on the premise that conflict counters tendencies towards in-action and apathetic compliance, situations where mentalities tend to take root and things are taken for granted. Moreover, conflicts can encourage self-evaluation to challenge conventional wisdom and theories in use by means of an 'elicitation process' to follow Sparrow (1998: 132). Conflicts are thus an important source of innovation in that they encourage the parties involved to search for solutions to underlying problems, often to the benefit of all. Such managers are 'innovators' for Henry (2001: 114). Finally, conflict 'can also serve as an important release valve that gets rid of pent-up pressures' (Morgan, 1993: 216) as it facilitates mutual accommodation in that it pre-empts more subversive or explosive resolutions. For Hales (1997: 25-26) this requires the manipulation power sources that include economic, cognitive and normative, whether they apply to people, or behaviours.

¹⁰⁰ To use Stacey et al (2000: 52) the culture content is characterised by an 'adaptionist teleology'.

¹⁰¹ It is the latter that has led Morgan (1993: 215) to note that conflict and power can serve both positive and negative functions.

The discursive content

Power, however, rests on the capacity to convince, to persuade. With Jones (1998: 417-418), the discursive content of management deals with the way power is discursively manufactured¹⁰². In other words, management as action is not determined by the act itself but rather the way both action and acts are formulated. The fundamental task of the manager then is to construct a discourse to provide a link between management as practice and those involved by it¹⁰³.

To achieve this goal, managers need to rationalise their successes and failures to sustain and enhance the right to manage while negating alternative views on management practice. At the same time demonstrate managerial rationality to colleagues, customers and competitors and other influential people in the environment, which further generates a sense of personal and organisational security. This also means, providing a number of assumptions underpinning management practice in that everything is explicable as there is nothing, in principle, that is unknowable. Further create a language and practice which enables organisational members to construct an identity for themselves to facilitate and legitimise the exercise of power. Finally that managers have the ability to both define the problems of the organisation and their solutions thereby creating a sense of comfort that their destiny is in their hands. Managers, overall, are looked upon as being the most advanced in management thinking. They are therefore expected to act as advisors or councillors. In brief, as gurus, in that they have the ability to take a distanced position relative to the unfolding events thus offer solutions to contemporary problems that rest on having developed and researched new models aiming at 'competitive advantage' (Collins, 1998: 41-42; Jones 1998: 419)¹⁰⁴. Such discourses aim at forcing through a change in organisational systems to meet new challenges according to Burnes (cited in Collins, 1998: 20). In this way managers arrive at transforming mentalities¹⁰⁵ and ordinary goals into challenges, in the attempt to raise needs to higher levels of motivation and maturity while striving to fulfil a potential. This is because the way management is conceptualised in discursive formations, consisting of structuring principles that govern beliefs and practices, it becomes a mode of representation producing particular material and social effects.

¹⁰² And thus contribute to the maintenance of management being a dominant discourse.

¹⁰³ The discursive approach, in its radical version is often used as a critique aiming at exposing the inherent contradictions residing in a discourse, especially that of 'dominant' discourses as that of management (Jones, 1998: 418-419). Put differently, in considering management discipline as a textual phenomenon it seeks to question the validity (and ethics) of imposing a version of reality on to others, since the formulation of management necessarily places an emphasis on what is said as on what is not said, Jones (1998: 423) notes. Here however, management action is concerned with discourse as act to facilitate management as a process. It is therefore underpinned by the argument that a discourse is the result of language rarefaction, but stated in an obverse manner. If a discourse is about placing an emphasis on what is to be said, thus omitting what is not to be said relative to personal and organisational goals a discourse is used functionally.

¹⁰⁴ It is, one can argue, the redeeming feature, and aim, of such management thinking with often-cited gurus, as in Collins (1993: 42-43) and Salaman (1997: 263-264). For instance, to start with Peters and Waterman who have argued that successful organisations are those that have learnt to manage and develop a corporate or business culture which displays certain key features. These include: homogeneity, action by focusing on meeting and exceeding customer expectations, autonomy and freedom of action, loose-tight forms of control, and a balance between strategy, structure, systems, staff, style, skills, and super-ordinate skills. Further, with Kanter who seems concerned with rekindling the spirit of enterprise and innovation for fear that the US economic hegemony is undermined. Finally with Pascale and Athose who account for Japanese competitiveness and therefore recommend a number of suggestions for Western managers to adopt to stay in the race. These include: capacity for renewal, tapping the skills and strengths of employees, and dealing with both the hard-S factors (strategy, structure, systems) and soft-S factors (style, skills, and super-ordinate skills).

¹⁰⁵ Following Bass (cited in Yukl, 1998: 325-326) transformational management is the behaviour that involves mainly idealised influence. Further, intellectual stimulation, to increase awareness of problems to view problems from a new perspective, and individualised considerations, to be supportive and encourage followers. Finally, inspirational motivation, to communicate a vision through symbols to focus subordinate effort and the modelling of appropriate behaviours.

11 OTHER-DIRECTED MYTHICAL VALIDATION

Outline

To inquire, under the other-directed approach, whether there is a difference between management descriptions and management experience both as actions and acts, the first step consists in developing the re-search tool. That is, a survey as a communication tool aiming to test the applicability of the finding made under the self-directed approach that a difference between experience and its description exists.

In detail, the purpose here is to test whether myths as descriptions of management experience reduce and transfigure this experience, both being the hypotheses being tested against set criteria¹⁰⁶. The second step consists in administering the survey. Finally, analysing and interpreting collected data.

Re-search tool development

To develop the re-search tool under the other-directed approach (see survey in appendix 1), one needs to start by operationalising the stated management myth-ologies by reducing them into statements. This is effected by highlighting the key signifiers that qualify each myth while setting each signifier as being a qualifier of management in the definitional form “management is ...”. But given that a management concern is characterised by a number of qualifiers, the definitional statements are clustered along the types that management myth-ologies highlight, namely, rational (1) turbulent (2), cultural (3), emotional (4), power (5), and discursive (6). Next, one needs to define the clusters relative to management actions the tasks involved with managing and structuring organisations within each myth-ology. Given however the variability of statements in that under each cluster there are indefinite numbers of statements to (re)present a management myth-ology, it is indispensable to reduce them in such a way so as to have an equal number of statements under each cluster¹⁰⁷. Otherwise any computational operation is rendered difficult, as there is a bias that is introduced in the survey towards some myths at the expense of others, not to mention that the questionnaire would not be of a manageable size.

Thus part A of the survey (The way I am experiencing, living, management practice is best translated or described to be about ...) seeks to inquire into management practice along myth-ologies 1 to 6 translated into 12 statements each, hence a total of 72 statements with a Likert scale (Sirkin, 1995: 40-42) appended to each statement so as to yield a score, 1 being the lower score and 5 the highest, translating, respectively, a difference between experience and its description, and no difference, i.e. a correspondence between experience and its description (see survey in appendix 1). To further render the survey uniform, a number of key concepts are clarified by adopting a unique way to describe them. Therefore, the distinction between “manager” and “staff” is assumed, and “management” is seen both as a particular discipline and function, stemming from the previous distinction. This is further made explicit in the instructions where care is also taken to reduce the likelihood that respondents do not see the survey as an opportunity to pass judgement on the management of the organisation as a whole, but rather focus on their own personal experience.

However, a number of variables need to be controlled, namely myth, organisational context, a possible textual correspondence between management as experienced and management as described, as mythified, and finally gender. The former three are controlled from within the survey, and the latter through the way the survey is administered.

¹⁰⁶ Decided without criterion.

¹⁰⁷ What to include and what to exclude, or even how to reduce statements is a decision without criterion.

To control for myth, the clusters have been constructed without the respondents knowing the structure or being able to identify it. Otherwise, the respondents would have had the possibility to know which myth is being tested, and thus focus their overall preference for one myth rather than the other, whereas the survey seeks to test the difference between experience and all available management descriptions¹⁰⁸.

To control for both the organisational context and a possible textual correspondence between management as experienced and as described, the survey seeks to inquire into the beliefs respondents have with regard to their management experience. The underlying rationale is that on the one hand, respondents are likely to answer relative to their organisational context with the risk of considering the statements as ideals of management for the organisation they are employed. On the other, there is no way of ensuring that respondents can discriminate between current experience, which is influenced by the organisational context, and having experienced in the past, of other organisational contexts.

Thus part B of the survey (management is guided by the belief that ...) is constructed along the six management myth-ologies from which three principles, or ‘assumptions’ for Harding and Long (1998: 5), are rendered into statements relative to clusters. It follows that the two parts of the survey are related because of the correspondence between the ontic quality underlying each ‘conceptual scheme’ to use Quine (quoted in Arrington, 1996: 196), the ‘essence expressed in grammar’ (Wittgenstein, 2001/1953: §371)¹⁰⁹, the management principles and described management practice.

	content					
	rational	turbulent	cultural	emotional	power	discursive
area	clusters					
Management is about ...	α	β	γ	δ	ϵ	ζ
Management is guided by a belief that ...	A	B	C	D	E	F

Figure 1: correspondence between management principles and practice

In other words, a corresponding score between, the clusters A to F inclusive, and α to ζ inclusive (see figure 1), where the ideal ratio is 4. Any obtained ratio scores that are higher indicate an important difference between ontology and praxis indicating an important organisational influence, in addition to respondents tending to consider the statements as ideals of management. This ratio is therefore used as selector prior to undergoing data analysis.

Other-directed postulates

Thus, to identify the difference between management experience and management description by means of the survey, it is necessary to show management myth-ologies as objectivities first, reduce experience and second, transfigure experience.

Starting from the former, it amounts to showing that management myth-ologies are not sufficient to capture experience in its totality, which implies that there is a need for constructing an additional myth-ology translated by a cluster of statements. Thus, from the presented clusters of statements, respondents are to establish the degree to which these statements can capture their management experience. We should therefore expect at least one respondent to confirm this hypothesis by scoring low in part A of the survey. Given that the minimum score is 72, the mean score 216, and the

¹⁰⁸ Within the limits of the accessibility of data.

¹⁰⁹ Pointing towards a rapprochement between Quine and Wittgenstein, although, as Arrington (1996: 197) points out, the former is concerned with establishing “being” (*existant*) and the latter undoing being.

maximum score 360, a significantly low score can be set as any one obtained that is lower than 144¹¹⁰ (hereafter LOS). This score seem to interpret well the idea that respondents find that not enough statements translate their management experience overall. But given the ‘normal distribution of frequencies’ (Sirkin, 1995: 208) one can expect middle scores and hence a difficulty to establish whether these confirm or refute the hypothesis. And given that the two parts of the survey are related as there is a correspondence between management principles and described management practice, part B of the survey is determinant, with the minimum score at 18, the mean score is 54, and the maximum score 90. Thus, if the respondents overall agree with the presented principles, that is a score lower than 54, they are considered to find that not enough statements translate their management experience. If the score is higher than 54, one can say that an important number of the statements translate management experience. Although this may help deciding upon moot scores, it is unlikely to reduce the effect of the normal distribution of frequencies. This may therefore yield significantly high scores, that is higher than 288¹¹¹ (hereafter HOS) in part A of the survey, which means that an important number of statements translate management experience, thereby likely to disprove the hypothesis that there is difference between experience and its description. It is therefore necessary to use an additional means for confirming the difference.

Since the presence of multinary opposition is necessary proof that management myth-ologies cannot wholly capture that which we experience, it means that respondents have variable preference for the presented myth-ologies, a hierarchy that reveals the dominance of some myth-ologies over others. And since this due to systems of procedures that rarefy language, one should expect that the rationality underlying dominant myth to act as a source of power to entice respondents. This would therefore mean that the dominant management myth-ology *appears to be able* to capture experience in its totality. But given the normal distribution of frequencies, it is likely to find LOS, thus creating a tension.

To therefore solve this tension, one needs to establish that management myth-ologies fail to capture management experience as such in that they transfigure it because of their totalising logic. This means that in effecting the comparison between that which one experiences and its description, there is non-coincidence: the myth-ology has strands that fail to capture experience relative to its internal coherence. Thus, we should expect that in each cluster there is at least one statement that fails to describe management experience, that is a score of 1 on the Likert scale (hereafter LSS) with higher scores given to the remaining statements. But given the variability in assigning scores to the remaining statements underpinned by a normal distribution, there is also the possibility that some statements are given a high score, that is a score of 5 on the Likert scale (hereafter HSS). Thus, if overall we obtain significantly more statements with LSS than HSS, one could argue that the management myth-ology under consideration fails to capture experience relative to its totalising logic, and hence a preference for those myth-ologies that appear coherent. As a measure of coherence, one can use the standard deviation for each myth-ology, in that the lower the deviation the more coherent the myth-ology is relative to the obtained replies for the statements making up the myth-ology under consideration. We should therefore expect in dominant myth-ologies a greater number of HSS and a low standard deviation. And re-tracing the above argument, confirm the presence of multinary opposition, and hence that management myth-ologies cannot wholly capture that which managers experience. At the same time, if, overall, we obtain significantly more statements with LSS than HSS, one could directly argue that the space that management myth-ologies cover does not coincide with the space of experience.

¹¹⁰ This is a decision without criterion.

¹¹¹ This is a decision without criterion.

Re-search setting

Having piloted the survey to identify inconsistencies in meaning and administration¹¹², the sample of respondents is randomly chosen to ensure that the elements composing the sample have an ‘equal and independent chance’ of being selected (Kumar, 1999: 154).

Thus from the 25 surveys that were sent for completion, only 15 returned, hence a return rate of 60%. To control for gender, the first six male and female respondents are only chosen. Thus from the 12 remaining surveys, and taking into account the ratios (see appendix 2, table 2), only 9 surveys are left for consideration, and the obtained scores (see appendix 2, table 1) have been amended (see appendix 2, table 3) to take into account the excluded responses.

Re-search findings

Relative to the first hypothesis, that management myth-ologies are reductive of management experience the survey shows that there is at least one respondent who confirms this is the case (see appendix 2, table 4). This is further confirmed by comparing the LSS and HSS: the former is higher than the latter (see appendix 2, tables 6 & 7). Relative to the second hypothesis, that management myth-ologies fail to capture management experience because they transfigure it, the data at hand (see appendix 2, tables 6 & 7) seem to confirm this. It seems that for some respondents at least one statement upsets the internal coherence of the myth-ology under consideration, despite this being significant (see appendix 2, table 8). Overall, there is a tendency to conclude that management experience is *not* captured by management myth-ologies – difference (to some extent) *exists*.

It would be correct however, to say that management experience is *relatively* not captured by management myth-ologies. This is because there are exceptions to the above. To start with a number of respondents are situated in the mean scores (see appendix 2, tables 4 & 5). Further, it is not entirely convincing that the LSS mean scores are significantly higher than the HSS mean scores. The most preferred myth-ology being the “discursive” (see appendix 2, table 3) has less HSS compared to other myth-ologies such as “rational” or “emotional” (see appendix 2, table 7) although it appears to be as coherent as the other myth-ologies (see appendix 2, table 8). It is therefore difficult to conclude that the “discursive” myth-ology is dominant and therefore confirm multinary opposition. Therefore, the tendency to disprove that that management experience is not captured by management myth-ologies is not to be neglected – difference (to some extent) *does not exist*.

Search at a distance from re-search

The above findings are not contradictory. They simply shed light on the argument, and expected conclusion I previously made through the self-directed approach, that *the other-directed approach cannot provide us with conclusions that are reliable, albeit valid, to either prove or disprove the difference between experience and its description.* The reason, overall, lies in the deficiencies of the prosthetic tool that the other-directed approach requires, regardless of the type of tool.

Such a tool, it is to be reminded, has been necessary as an ‘augmentation’ (*προσθεσις*) of the body, of *myself* to use Wills (in Lilley, 2001: 81), to remedy a deficiency, *my in-ability* to transpose *my* findings on *myself* onto the other. This is what Lilley, (2001: 81) seems to be pointing out when stating that ‘the deficiencies of the body, such as the inability to see beyond certain limits are re-presented, invented and materialised in a device that can be attached to the body to overcome that deficiency’. For Lilley (2001: 82) such ‘extensions of the body are precisely the resources we need to understand

¹¹² The first version of the survey that was piloted tended to yield information on ‘what management should be’. Consequently, it was revised, to render its discourse more practice-oriented and more personal, as per the premises of the self-directed approach.

intentions, since intentions are, in part, ‘given’ by them’. In other words, not only Lilley (2001: 83, original emphasis) expects the use of such prosthetic resources given that he views the ‘inside as *nothing* but the fold of the outside’, seemingly after Deleuze, but they are also a natural extension. From the very application of the other-directed approach, it seems to *me*, that the problem does not lie in the use of such prosthetic resources but rather in their ability to perform what they are expected to.

Thus a corollary to the above conclusion is *that other-directed tools cannot be of help to arrive at conclusions that are reliable, albeit valid, to either prove or disprove the difference between experience and its description.*

Indeed, the survey is the result of *my* having experienced (re)presentations of management and therefore respondents experience the statements about management according to how *I* have experienced the presentation of management myths, since I deduced the statements. It is therefore not how the respondents describe their experience. But given that this has resulted from the chosen re-search method, one could question whether another method would be more appropriate¹¹³. The problem, it seems, is not solved: regardless of the re-search method *I* still have to experience what the others (re)present and *I* cannot be sure it is a true (re)presentation of their management experience.

Further, each respondent experiences the statements and checks through the Likert scale the degree of (re)presentativity of each statement¹¹⁴, and considering the above findings, it would appear that the respondents do not agree overall that the statements are the true presentation of their experience. The statements are not the object under scrutiny, but a tool of observation and their validity arises from the respondents’ ability to identify with them. By extension, management myth-ologies are spectacles allowing one to capture phenomena and our knowledge of myth-ologies lies in their very use, as Polanyi and Prosch (1975: 37) have observed.

Owing to the metaphoric and historic functions of myth, an interpretation of data is akin to giving meaning to past phenomena, a point that Cassirer (1972/1944: 174, 177) also makes. It is an ideal reconstruction¹¹⁵. This not due to the fact that the survey can inquire either into past events, or expectations for the future, hence acts, since observing the present, making sense of actions also involves translating them through language. Rather, it is due to the historic function of myth: they indicate the past and are the past as they occur after having experienced the present.

An added difficulty is my impossibility to establish that what I (re)present in the survey corresponds to what I have experienced as management (re)presentations, that is, the management descriptions made by others and from where I constructed the management myth-ologies. Further, the management myth-ologies form a metatheory whose inclusiveness can be put into question since the grounds on which ‘certain situations or problems should be classified into an integrative framework’ (Elfring and Volberda, 2001: 15) are not clear.

Overall, myth-ologies treat management as a textual phenomenon concerned with the strict relationship between language, thought, and action as ‘event’ (Deleuze, 1990/1969: 149). This means that there is no necessary translation in the relationship between management discourses and management reality, a finding that the self-directed approach has yielded because such a postulate was made, given the transfiguring and reductive functions of language. It follows that knowledge of others is indeterminate and the survey or any empirical method that seeks to inquire in the other is ineffective in the absolutist sense. In relative terms, a description is only to some degree different of experience.

¹¹³ Such as an open-ended interview aiming to give respondents the opportunity to narrate their management experience. However as it was mentioned in chapter 2, it seems unlikely to improve the findings since constructed empirical tools are descriptions of an experience.

¹¹⁴ The same problem would happen relative to questions posed to respondents through other empirical tools.

¹¹⁵ One could further argue that any action of data interpretation is akin to reading symbols and therefore distinction made by Cassirer (1972/1944: 173) between empirical and historical methods does not hold. Indeed, he claims that the former allows the re-experiencing of phenomena but not the latter since the events referred to are literally past and therefore one has to resort to reading symbols, as being the only source for meaning generation. Yet making sense of the world involves language, and therefore the translation of what is observed into a signifier.

Relative difference and distance

One could then argue that empirical methods are effective in relative terms. However, to establish that experience and its description are relatively different, at varying degrees, is tantamount to claiming that the difference exists - the contrary also being true that there is no difference. This is a critical point in sense of a 'bifurcation' (Eve, 1997: 272). If the centre is that there is no difference, any lesser degree implies its opposite, that there is difference. Thus if the point of departure is that there is in all points a coincidence between the description and that experienced, it could mean that the variety of descriptive systems, be it, approaches, concepts, paradigms, discourses and myths have the same content. If this is not the case, considering that each content may refer to different actions and acts, it could mean that this totality of descriptive systems tends to lose the ability capture the totality of experience. Thus a relative measure to this would signify a tendency towards non-coincidence, a state that cannot be attained. Conversely, if the centre is that there is difference, any lesser degree implies its opposite, that there is no difference. If the point of departure is that there is difference and therefore an excess of signification over experience in that the descriptive plane covers the experiential plane, we find ourselves in the premises of the previous line of thought. But if the point of departure is that there is difference meaning a *de facto* excess of experience that is not captured by a descriptive system, there is room for the construction of additional descriptive systems. A relative measure to this would signify the tendency towards a coincidence between the descriptive and experiential planes a state that cannot be attained.

Thus if difference and non-difference are simultaneously considered, it means that both difference and *in*-difference as states are moments of non-coincidence and coincidence, respectively. To use Derrida (2001/1967: 106), they signify a departure from their being and from the categories which describe them. Thus there must be elements in one state to generate the other and vice versa, thus a process that enables the ongoing passage from difference to non-difference, without attaining neither of the two extremes, thus a difference that is variably relative, even in its signification. Yet this implies a difference, because the tendency towards either difference or *in*-difference along their continuum is a tendency, a gap, thus a difference. At the same time this is a situation of *un*-determinacy. It can be explained by the finding that empirical knowledge is *un*-specifiable as nothing in any concept captured by the sentences points objectively or automatically to any sort of experience. What is more, the criteria for establishing whether or not it is the case that there is a difference are equally *un*-determinate, because their validity rests on other criteria *ad infinitum*.

On the one hand, this requires the adoption of a mythopoeic approach, to resort to a logical method for proving the difference, which entails pursuing, within the mythical method, the examination and therefore description of the difference by means of an "either-or" logic, which, is absolute. This also entails completing the creation of a myth - that started implicitly with the examination of mythical language - with its systems of thought and metaphors, which takes place simultaneously with proving the difference logically. On the other, it requires highlighting the moments when the myth under construction is challenged from within as the discursive signature is put under tension relative to what is meant to capture: experience. Not only in terms of the difference between what the myth recounts and what one experiences but also the experience of the myth itself. The discursive signature is, simply put, unable to maintain the coherence of myth relative to experience, as the different mythic paths previously thought as true, are questioned as they are found to be *un*-familiar, ambiguous.

At some point however we must take a *de*-cision as separation, the first one as *in*-difference, and establish that a *concept relates to an experience, moreover which concept relates to what experience - decisions without criterion grounded in described personal sedimented experience.*

This however does not and *should not* imply setting a space to cover our own experience, a coincidence between experience and its description, nor that a given concept bears upon an experience and thus enable us to trust it as knowledge. Not only does this apply to the other-directed approach, being the overall conclusion reached through the other-directed mythical validation, but also to the self-directed approach, as *I* cannot be sure that which *I* describe can be trusted as knowledge.

Therefore, through both approaches we have the same chances of proving and disproving that experience is different from its description. This means that any attempt to know whether there is a difference between experience and its description is *un-conclusive*: it can only be approached, progressively but never be reached. It can be described but not perfectly. In other words, *my* experience and that of the other relative to a common concern, be it management, although mediated through a description, is found to be *at a distance*.

CHAPTER 12 WHAT IS LEFT?

12 WHAT IS LEFT TO EXPERIENCE AND DESCRIBE?

Improvements

Specifically, it seems important to further experience the other-directed approach in all its methods. Further to organise such an heuristic experience in different organisational contexts to account for additional variables, the most important being culture, or a mythical community. The aim here is *not* to propound ‘methodological pluralism’ (Gill and Johnson, 1997: 133-137), as one cannot be sure that such an approach can prove or disprove the difference but simply to describe the different interactions between self and other under these circumstances. This is also a point made by Csikszentmihalyi, and Robinson (1990: xiv) who instead of seeking a reductive explanation, are interested in understanding what the experience means to the people who have it¹¹⁶. Further, to capture the legal content of management myth-ologies. Finally, to reconstruct samples so as to be able to overcome the low ‘population validity’ (Gill & Johnson, 1997: 128) that one can argue against the current re-search¹¹⁷, not due to the way the survey was organised, but to the reluctance by some of the respondents to participate in the survey.

This, however, does not render the findings of the re-search *un*-reliable. On the contrary, there are strong indications that the other-directed approach is unable to furnish us with a definite answer as per the confirmation of the claim that there is a difference between experience and its description. This is because there must be correspondence between experience and its description. For Schutz (1967/1932: 162), it seems, there must be a complementarity of motives ‘validating each other as objects of reciprocal attention’. Specifically, Schutz (1967/1932: 160) claims that the re-searcher fantasises in the future perfect tense that the respondent, self or other, will provide answers, and thus will become a genuine ‘because-motive’ for the reply. But for Schutz (1967/1932: 160-161) a because-motive can only be grasped in the ‘pluperfect’ tense relative to action. The act of answering thus appears as past to the re-searcher, and the respondent’s motive appears in the pluperfect. However, the re-searcher cannot know that the question is the respondent’s genuine because-motive. This is a presupposition derived from sedimented experience. As Schutz (1967/1932: 161) also notes, the re-searcher does not really know that the question will actually enter the respondent’s consciousness when and if an answer is provided. Nor can one be sure that it has, once the answer has been given. And it is further uncertain whether the person questioned has looked upon the question as the genuine because-motive of one’s answer. Finally it is uncertain whether the answer the re-searcher interprets occurs without any meaning connected with it. In other words, for Schutz one cannot know what was really meant as an answer. Schutz (1967/1932: 161) further notes that the orientation of the respondent reflects that of the re-searcher, in that ‘the very concept of an answer presupposes that a question has been asked’. In such a situation, Schutz (1967/1932: 161-162) notes, where there is a dialectic between re-searcher and respondent since when ‘the two partners are face to face, their streams of consciousness are synchronised and geared into each other’. Thus, there is mutual influence as per the motives of each other. This does *not* imply symmetry, let alone correspondence, nor equality, and thus it is necessary to first inquire into the motives prior to using other-directed methods for inquiring into the difference between experience and its description, hence a situation of infinite regress.

¹¹⁶ And thus propose the use of semi-structured interviews.

¹¹⁷ If the desired accuracy level is 5% and the number of standard deviations for a desired level of confidence is 99.73%, with $z = 3.00$, the sample size must include at least 48 respondents.

At the same time it seems necessary to carry out additional mythographic studies¹¹⁸ similar to that done by Doty (2000: 173) on Freud on the basis that the latter's interpretation theory is a myth-ological construct as it is underpinned by a myth-ological system that transforms and modifies foreign materials. Finally, it seems important to uncover additional mythic paths within the logic of the self-directed approach, thus establish a system and a systemic, so as to ground the myth further as 'a self-contained system deriving its ontology from language' (Gould, 1981: 11). As a part of the myth is the de-mythification strategy, which could be applied to different circumstances and disciplines so as to uncover the limits of the myth itself, its boundary.

Getting close to difference: is it possible?

It is however questionable as to whether the above marginal improvements are likely to get us closer to validly show that there is a difference between experience and its description. Is it not the question of "validity" mythical? To use Hatab (1990: 26), if *I* aim here at letting 'the myth speak of itself', it seems important to recognise, and not accept as de facto, that the existential context can neither be seen in terms of objectivity nor of subjectivity¹¹⁹. And if the argument made by Hatab (1990: 26) that the essential feature of 'mythical disclosure' is 'givenness', we therefore need to be aware that

[t]he imagery of myth shows that objectivity is out of place (since myth is an existential story); furthermore, subjectivity is out of place (since the centre of attention is a human-transcending element). In other words, myth shows that the world is disclosed through the human existential situation, but at the same time it is not human-centred-that is, the world is an existential transcendence.

In other words, neither the other-directed nor the self-directed approach will *ever* be capable of establishing once and for all the difference between experience and its description. This is because the former inquires into 'this other person, this Thou, [who] has his (sic) own unique experiences and meaning-contexts' and this 'no other person, not, even he (sic) himself at another moment, can stand in his (sic) shoes at this moment' (Schutz, 1967/1932: 135). As Libet (1996: 97) notes 'only an introspective report by the subject can have primary validity as an operational measure of a subjective experience'. The latter requires its presentation and hence one cannot be sure that what the other experiences as a description is that which *I* have experienced, a point also made by Libet.

The reason *I* attribute to this is the very *différance* between experience and its description. Thus "experience" and its "description" are not an irreducible duality. Being off-centre, they are at times close and others remote in a play, in a mythic pulse.

....

¹¹⁸ And eventually include, for instance, myths of consciousness (Baars & McGovern, 1996:76-91), decision-making (Beach: 1997: 126-131, 143-161), globalisation (Held & McGrew, 2002: 98-117) to establish the discursive signatures and the possible parallels with those established here.

¹¹⁹ Hatab (1990: 25-26) claims, on phenomenological grounds, that myths 'precede objectivity' in that the world-as-is is uncovered in interactivity first and then described. Myths, moreover, cannot portray human emotions or needs. The explanation that Hatab (1990: 25-26) gives is that historically the notions of "detached objectivity" and the "subjective self" are of later developments.

APPENDIX 1

SURVEY ON MANAGEMENT

The purpose of this survey is to inquire whether the proposed statements translate well the way YOU are experiencing management (part A), in addition to what YOU believe management is about (part B). It is not a survey on what management should be!

INSTRUCTIONS

Put a tick in the box of your preference in all the statements. Allow only one tick per statement.

CONFIDENTIALITY

Fully completed and returned surveys are treated confidentially, and no information will be revealed for whatever purpose.

COMPLETED SURVEYS

Please place in my mailbox the completed survey by 30 March 2003.

Thank you for your time and contribution!

male female

P. Zamaros

A The way I am experiencing, living, management practice is best translated or described to be about

- | | | | | | | |
|----|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1 | Using rational analyses of operations and influences. | <input type="checkbox"/> not at all | <input type="checkbox"/> not really | <input type="checkbox"/> it's close | <input type="checkbox"/> quite close | <input type="checkbox"/> that's it! |
| 2 | Implementing actions only after the planning phase has been completed. | <input type="checkbox"/> not at all | <input type="checkbox"/> not really | <input type="checkbox"/> it's close | <input type="checkbox"/> quite close | <input type="checkbox"/> that's it! |
| 3 | Dealing with exceptional issues. | <input type="checkbox"/> not at all | <input type="checkbox"/> not really | <input type="checkbox"/> it's close | <input type="checkbox"/> quite close | <input type="checkbox"/> that's it! |
| 4 | Putting in place organisational structures that clarify responsibilities. | <input type="checkbox"/> not at all | <input type="checkbox"/> not really | <input type="checkbox"/> it's close | <input type="checkbox"/> quite close | <input type="checkbox"/> that's it! |
| 5 | Grouping staff activities in units. | <input type="checkbox"/> not at all | <input type="checkbox"/> not really | <input type="checkbox"/> it's close | <input type="checkbox"/> quite close | <input type="checkbox"/> that's it! |
| 6 | Selecting members of staff relative to needs. | <input type="checkbox"/> not at all | <input type="checkbox"/> not really | <input type="checkbox"/> it's close | <input type="checkbox"/> quite close | <input type="checkbox"/> that's it! |
| 7 | Maintaining an active staff. | <input type="checkbox"/> not at all | <input type="checkbox"/> not really | <input type="checkbox"/> it's close | <input type="checkbox"/> quite close | <input type="checkbox"/> that's it! |
| 8 | Letting staff to handle all routine matters. | <input type="checkbox"/> not at all | <input type="checkbox"/> not really | <input type="checkbox"/> it's close | <input type="checkbox"/> quite close | <input type="checkbox"/> that's it! |
| 9 | Drawing up plans of action. | <input type="checkbox"/> not at all | <input type="checkbox"/> not really | <input type="checkbox"/> it's close | <input type="checkbox"/> quite close | <input type="checkbox"/> that's it! |
| 10 | Determining the resources of my department, area of concern, or the organisation. | <input type="checkbox"/> not at all | <input type="checkbox"/> not really | <input type="checkbox"/> it's close | <input type="checkbox"/> quite close | <input type="checkbox"/> that's it! |
| 11 | Controlling that everything occurs in conformity with policy and practice. | <input type="checkbox"/> not at all | <input type="checkbox"/> not really | <input type="checkbox"/> it's close | <input type="checkbox"/> quite close | <input type="checkbox"/> that's it! |
| 12 | Organising work in pyramidal and multidivisional structures | <input type="checkbox"/> not at all | <input type="checkbox"/> not really | <input type="checkbox"/> it's close | <input type="checkbox"/> quite close | <input type="checkbox"/> that's it! |

13	Using holistic tools and frames of mind.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
14	Scanning the business environment to understand the forces that affect my organisation.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
15	Acting differentially as situations require.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
16	Emphasising on plurality in the search of options relative to external and internal pressures.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
17	Adopting ad hoc policies when confronted with a larger and often hostile environment.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
18	Dealing with diversity and variety as such.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
19	Aligning and re-aligning my department or organisation with its environment.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
20	Obtaining the necessary resources to challenge my environment.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
21	Weighing up the nature and scope of action and on the appropriate focus of decision-making.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
22	Considering the past and future direction of actions.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
23	Monitoring critical tasks and critical points.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
24	Organising work in networks.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
25	Using technologies that develop the personality and mentality of staff.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
26	Giving staff the autonomy to own the responsibility of their actions.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
27	Influencing the assumptions and beliefs of staff so as to become shared.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
28	Shaping the culture of the group.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
29	Developing a culture of teamwork.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
30	Providing staff with a sense of common direction and guidelines for behaviour.	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
31	Directing staff conduct.					

	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
32	Reinforcing the construction of ideals relative to the success of my department or the organisation.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
33	Constructing a single discourse, a unique view staff can recognise.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
34	Developing and using symbolic aspects of the organisation.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
35	Ensuring continuity in contingent situations.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
36	Organising work according to expert knowledge.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
37	Using individual values as a source of power.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
38	Caring for staff and what they think of my department or the organisation.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
39	Developing high-quality exchanges with staff.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
40	Developing mutual understanding and learning.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
41	Providing corrective feedback.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
42	Explaining the adverse impact of incorrect behaviour.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
43	Eliciting improvements in patterns of work.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
44	Telling staff what is expected from them.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
45	Encouraging staff to take initiative.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
46	Encouraging staff to inform and verify the accuracy of any information they receive.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
47	Encouraging staff to seek feedback from my or other managers.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
48	Organising work collegially.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
49	Observing the behaviour of others members of the department or the organisation.				
	<input type="radio"/> not at all	<input type="radio"/> not really	<input type="radio"/> it's close	<input type="radio"/> quite close	<input type="radio"/> that's it!
50	Balancing and co-ordinating the interests of the members of the organisation.				

	0 not at all	0 not really	0 it's close	0 quite close	0 that's it!
51					
52					
53					
54					
55					
56					
57					
58					
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60					
61					
62					
63					
64					
65					
66					
67					
68					

- 69 Offering solutions to problems that rest on my having developed new models and methods.
 not at all not really it's close quite close that's it!
- 70 Raising the levels of motivation and maturity while striving to fulfil staff potential.
 not at all not really it's close quite close that's it!
- 71 Organising work independently of what is formally established.
 not at all not really it's close quite close that's it!
- 72 Using persuasive methods and tactics.
 not at all not really it's close quite close that's it!

B The way I practice management is guided by the belief that

- 1 Processes of thought are independent of action and therefore controllable.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree
- 2 Work is to be organised and studied scientifically and objectively.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree
- 3 Power is to be concentrated at the top and applied by virtue of the position held.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree
- 4 The business environment is contingent and turbulent.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree
- 5 Organisations need to adapt to needs and pressures so as to effect a fit with contextual contingencies.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree
- 6 Power is diffuse and stems from different an changing sources.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree
- 7 Organisations are embedded in the social fabric of their environment.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree
- 8 The cultural rules of a society provide the norms to guide organisational action.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree
- 9 Power stems from the use of symbols and technologies for regulating behaviour.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree
- 10 Organisational processes are influenced by the emotions of organisational members.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree
- 11 There must be separate relationships with each individual member of staff.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree
- 12 Power is located within the hands of individual members of the organisation.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree
- 13 Organisational processes are disorderly as different interests influence them.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree
- 14 Conflict can be a means to arrive at individual or organisation goals.
 totally disagree disagree partially (dis)agree agree totally agree

- 15 Power arises from groups vying for their own interests.
0 totally disagree 0 disagree 0 partially (dis)agree 0 agree 0 totally agree
- 16 There is a unique way of thinking to organise organisational processes for competitive advantage.
0 totally disagree 0 disagree 0 partially (dis)agree 0 agree 0 totally agree
- 17 The formulation of a vision gives a sense of direction by engaging the thoughts and feelings of others.
0 totally disagree 0 disagree 0 partially (dis)agree 0 agree 0 totally agree
- 18 Power arises from particular ways to organise and use language.
0 totally disagree 0 disagree 0 partially (dis)agree 0 agree 0 totally agree
-

APPENDIX 2

table 1: CLUSTER SCORES

survey part A

MYTH	1	2	3	4	5	6				
RESPONDENT							total scores	mean score	standard deviation	interval
1	50	51	49	55	55	44	304	50,7	4,13	D
2	33	32	36	36	19	34	190	31,7	6,41	B
3	21	13	19	15	13	15	96	16,0	3,29	A
4	36	36	40	42	31	46	231	38,5	5,28	C
5	40	31	29	51	34	43	228	38,0	8,29	C
6	41	40	34	35	30	43	223	37,2	4,96	C
7	41	45	41	50	28	43	248	41,3	7,34	C
8	36	39	41	40	30	41	227	37,8	4,26	C
9	31	35	31	29	30	41	197	32,8	4,49	B
10	45	48	46	48	36	54	277	46,2	5,88	C
11	33	32	32	34	30	46	207	34,5	5,79	B
12	46	45	45	47	37	50	270	45,0	4,34	C
Mean	37,8	37,3	36,9	40,2	31,1	41,7				
Rank	3	4	5	2	6	1				
	overall mean	target mean	standard deviation							
	37,5	36	3,64							

table 2: RATIO SCORES

survey part A combined with part B

RESPONDENT		inclusion
1	5,06	no
2	3,71	yes
3	1,50	yes
4	3,55	yes
5	3,67	yes
6	3,48	yes
7	4,76	no
8	4,82	no
9	3,58	yes
10	4,00	no
11	3,56	yes
12	4,15	no
mean	3,82	
st. deviation	0,92	

table 3: AMENDED CLUSTER SCORES

survey part A

MYTH	1	2	3	4	5	6					
RESPONDENT							total scores	mean score	standard deviation	interval	
2	33	32	36	36	19	34	190	31,7	6,41	B	
3	21	13	19	15	13	15	96	16,0	3,29	A	
4	36	36	40	42	31	46	231	38,5	5,28	C	
5	40	31	29	51	34	43	228	38,0	8,29	C	
6	41	40	34	35	30	43	223	37,2	4,96	C	
9	31	35	31	29	30	41	197	32,8	4,49	B	
10	45	48	46	48	36	54	277	46,2	5,88	C	
11	33	32	32	34	30	46	207	34,5	5,79	B	
12	46	45	45	47	37	50	270	45,0	4,34	C	
mean	36,2	34,7	34,7	37,4	28,9	41,3					
rank	3	4 or 5	4 or 5	2	6	1					
	overall mean	target mean	standard deviation								
	35,5	36	4,08								

table 4: DEGREE TO WHICH THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE

survey part A without combining data from part B

target score = 72-144

%	1% - 25%	26% - 50%	51% - 75%	76%-100%	
score	72-144	145-216	217-288	289-360	total
interval	A	B	C	D	
frequencies	1	3	5	0	9

table 5: DEGREE TO WHICH THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE

survey part A taking into account data from part B

target score = 72-144

%	1% - 25%	26% - 50%	51% - 75%	76%-100%	
score	72-144	145-216	217-288	289-360	total
interval	A	B	C	D	
frequencies	1	4	4	0	9

table 6: LSS
survey part A

MYTH	1	2	3	4	5	6	
RESPONDENT							total
2	3	2	2	0	6	0	13
3	7	12	7	12	11	12	61
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	2	2	5	1	3	2	15
6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
total	12	16	14	13	20	14	
mean	1,3	1,8	1,6	1,4	2,2	1,6	
	overall mean						
	1,6						

table 7: HSS
survey part A

MYTH	1	2	3	4	5	6	
RESPONDENT							total
2	2	1	0	1	0	0	4
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
5	5	2	2	6	0	3	18
6	2	0	1	0	0	0	3
9	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
10	1	3	1	5	3	0	13
11	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
12	1	2	3	2	0	2	10
total	11	9	7	14	3	8	
mean	1,2	1,0	0,8	1,6	0,3	0,9	
	overall mean						
	1,0						

table 8: CLUSTER COHERENCE

MYTH	1	2	3	4	5	6
RESPONDENT						
2	1,49	1,24	1,15	0,91	0,82	0,73
3	1,08	0,27	0,75	0,82	0,38	0,53
4	0,81	0,88	0,62	0,5	0,93	0,74
5	1,54	1,47	1,52	1,08	1,56	1,48
6	1,11	0,84	0,89	0,75	0,61	0,82
9	0,64	0,49	0,48	0,49	0,6	1,02
10	0,59	0,91	0,55	0,66	0,98	0,76
11	0,59	0,62	0,62	0,57	0,44	0,63
12	0,55	0,72	0,7	0,85	0,64	0,75
mean	0,9	0,8	0,8	0,7	0,8	0,8
	overall mean	target mean	standard deviation			
	0,8	0,0	0,07			

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