

Heidegger: a Map of the Metaphysical Evolution of Being

Panayotis Zamaros
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For reference:

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With reference to Heidegger's *Metaphysics as History of Being*, one can trace the following evolution from the premetaphysical to the metaphysical.

'In the beginning of its History Being opens itself out as'¹unconcealment (P1), emergence (P2) ground (P3) and principle (P4):

Premetaphysical (P)	Metaphysical I (Mi)	Metaphysical II (Mii)
<u>P1. unconcealment (aletheia)</u> ²	truth (homoiosis - adequatio) ³	proposition (logos) > certainty ⁴
<p><u>P2. emergence (physis)</u>⁵ > P2A essence/presencing (koinon)⁶ > manner of presencing (<i>eidōs</i>)⁷ > beingness (<i>ousia</i>)⁸, unity (en)⁹ P2B presencing (ergon)¹⁰ > presence (<i>ousia</i>)¹¹</p>	<p>P2B division into¹² Mi2A. presence/permanence in the secondary sense (deutera<i>i</i> <i>ousiai</i>): <u>whatness</u> (ti estin, essentia): <i>idea</i>¹³ > representational thought¹⁴, seeming/outer appearance (<i>eidolon</i>)¹⁵ Mi2B. presence/permanence in the primary sense (<i>kyriotatai ousiai</i>): <u>thatness</u> (oti estin, existentia)¹⁶; in presence (en-<i>ergeia</i>)¹⁷, fulfilled gathering (<i>entlechia</i>)¹⁸, permanence (<i>ousia, tode ti</i>)¹⁹</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mi2B evolution into: actuality (<i>actualitas</i>) > reality (<i>actualitas</i>) > <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ truly real (<i>actus purus</i>)²⁰ > goodness (<i>bonum</i>)²¹ ○ effecting as representing (<i>percipere</i>)²² > unity > monad²³ > striving (<i>appetitus</i>)²⁴ > force (<i>vis viva</i>)²⁵, inclination to realization (<i>nisus</i>), endeavor of possibility (<i>conatus</i>)²⁶ ↗²⁷ • P2B evolution²⁸ into fact (<i>factum</i>), action (<i>actus</i>) • P2B division into²⁹ Mii2A. <u>whatness</u>: potential (<i>potentia</i> > <i>possibilitas</i>) > essential/essence (<i>essentia</i> = <i>quidditas</i>)³⁰ Mii2B. <u>thatness</u>: reality (<i>actualitas</i>)³¹, <i>esse</i>³² > standing out (<i>ex-sistens</i>)³³ > existence (<i>existentia</i>)³⁴ ↗
<u>P3. ground (hypokeimenon)</u> ³⁵	what lies present (<i>kataphasis</i>) ³⁶ > what is shown and stated - predicated (<i>legomenon kath'autoi</i>) ³⁷ > categories as characterizations of what is (<i>kategoriai</i>) ³⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • subject (<i>subiectum, voluntas, mens humana</i>)³⁹ > I (<i>ego</i>)⁴⁰ • <i>hypokeimenon</i> and <i>logos</i> > ratio, predicate, opine (<i>rheo, rhesis</i>)⁴¹ > thinking (<i>cogitare</i>) • substance (<i>substantia</i>)⁴²
<u>P4. principle (arche)</u> ⁴³	arche and <i>idea</i> (<i>eidōs</i>) > cause (<i>aetia</i>) ⁴⁴	cause (<i>causalitas</i>)

References :

HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1972/1969), *On Being and Time*, Stambaugh translator, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1973), *The End of Philosophy*, Stambaugh translator, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Online 1: ARISTOTELIS, Μεταφυσικά/Metaphysique, *L'antiquité grecque et latine*, <http://www.remacler.org/>, 28.8.8.

Notes :

¹ Heidegger, 1973: 4.

² Heidegger, 1973: 4

³ Heidegger, 1973: 17.

⁴ Heidegger, 1973: 20, 24. Certainty expresses consciousness as valid and authoritative knowledge.

⁵ Heidegger, 1973: 4. Emergence implies motion but also to produce or represent (*ποιησις*) (Heidegger, 1973: 5).

⁶ Heidegger, 1973: 8-9.

⁷ Heidegger, 1973: 9.

⁸ Heidegger, 1973: 8.

⁹ Heidegger, 1973: 8.

¹⁰ Heidegger, 1973: 4.

¹¹ Heidegger, 1973: 4, 6.

¹² Heidegger, 1973: 6. This is a distinction of a two-fold presence (*ουσια*) that occurs in Aristotelis (a continuation from premetaphysical P2B). But as he carries with him the Platonic idea (*ειδος*) as that which is seen, Heidegger makes the correspondence between whatness and idea (*ειδος*) i.e. *ουσια* in the secondary sense (MI2A) and between thatness and presencing (*ενεργεια*) i.e. *ουσια* in the secondary sense (MI2B).

¹³ 1973: 11.

¹⁴ 'Reality is representation in the sense of the constancy of the continuous which is set up *by* certain representational thinking and *for* it.' (1973 : 25, original emphases).

¹⁵ Heidegger, 1973: 9, 10.

¹⁶ Heidegger, 1973: 7

¹⁷ Heidegger, 1973: 5, 10. If Aristotelis thinks that which is (*τοδε τι*) as presencing (*ενεργεια*) in contrast to Platonas who thinks of presencing (*κινουσι*) as the common denominator in the idea (*ειδος*), Heidegger does think that the former captures the premetaphysical because 'between *ενεργεια* and the primordial essence of Being (*αληθεια/φουσις*) stands the *idea*.' (1973: 10, I have rewritten *energeia, aletheia, physis*). But this is a Platonic idea (*ειδος*), which explains why for Heidegger metaphysics is Platonism (1972/1969: 57) since with Platonas idea (*ειδος*) is the first distortion relatively to the premetaphysical.

¹⁸ Heidegger, 1973: 6. Heidegger (1973: 33) notes that Leibniz does not retain the Aristotelian meaning as he talks about "perfection" and "self-sufficiency" (*αυταρχεια*).

¹⁹ Heidegger, 1973: 6.

²⁰ Heidegger, 1973: 15.

²¹ Heidegger, 1973: 15, 23. *Bonum*, as *summun bonum*, is the purest expression for causality that combines value as virtue and the Platonic sense of 'αγαθον ... [as] what absolutely makes capable' (Heidegger, 1973: 13; I have rewritten *agathon*)

²² Representation constitutes the fundamental feature of reality in that 'every being is only truly in being as a representing being' (Heidegger, 1973: 32): substantiality, substance, representation become the same.

²³ For Leibniz (in Heidegger, 1973: 33, footnote, original emphases) 'what is not truly *a* being is not truly a *being*': *veritas* and *actualitas* become *one*.

²⁴ 'The simple unifying unity is originally effecting in accordance with the manner of representational striving.' (Heidegger, 1973: 37).

²⁵ For Leibniz, according to Heidegger (1973: 38, 39) 'every *subiectum* is determined in its *esse* by *vis* (*perceptio-appetitus*)... this essence constitutes the fundamental character of *existentia*.' The importance of representation in relation to *vis* is underlined later on (Heidegger, 1973: 45, original emphasis): 'a man (sic) representing something means: he (sic) *is* somebody. This Being belongs to *vis*.'

²⁶ Heidegger, 1973: 41.

²⁷ Heidegger (1973: 41) builds highlights a relationship between *essentia* and *existentia* in Leibniz: ‘representing, striving stabilization [i.e. *essentia*] is the nature of *existentia*.’

²⁸ ‘The essence of the “work” is no longer “workness” in the sense of distinctive presencing in the open...’ (Heidegger, 1973: 12).

²⁹ The original division is maintained (Heidegger, 1973 : 13)

³⁰ Heidegger, 1973: 2.

³¹ Heidegger, 1973: 17-18. *Ex-sistentia*, *actualitas* and causality are related.

³² Heidegger, 1973: 15.

³³ Heidegger, 1973: 16. Genealogically speaking, Heidegger traces the origin of “*ex-sistentia*” in the Aristotelian expression ‘περὶ δὲ τὸ ἔξω ὄν καὶ χωριστόν’ (of the outside being which can exist apart) (Online 1, *Metaphysics*, Book XI (K), 1065a, lines 23-24, my translation). The other reference that Heidegger (1973: 16) makes about Aristotelis seems to be misquoted; what is closer to what Heidegger states, is 1028a (my translation): ‘ἔξω δηλοῦσιν οὐσαν τινα φύσιν τοῦ ὄντος’ (do not declare anything outside what a being is about).

³⁴ Heidegger, 1973: 12.

³⁵ Heidegger, 1973: 26, 28.

³⁶ Heidegger, 1973 : 27-28

³⁷ Heidegger, 1973: 27.

³⁸ Heidegger, 1973: 28.

³⁹ ‘...what is placed and thrown under in the *actus*...’ (Heidegger, 1973 : 27). With Descartes the Aristotelian υποκειμενον becomes a ‘*subiectum* [whose] has its essence in the *actus* of *cogitare* (*percipere*).’ (Heidegger, 1973 : 31).

⁴⁰ The *ego* is the *res cogitans* with a distinctive *subiectum* ‘whose esse, that is, presencing, suffices for ... certainty.’ (Heidegger, 1973 : 29.)

⁴¹ Heidegger, 1973 : 28.

⁴² Heidegger, 1973: 27. Henceforth, *ousia* is rendered as substance rather than presencing.

⁴³ Heidegger, 1973: 14, 28.

⁴⁴ To be precise, principle (*arche*) is transformed to cause (*αιτιον*) because ‘whatness is the matter of everything, that is, its cause.’ (Heidegger, 1973: 13)